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Introduction: Memory, Trauma, and Collective Identity
Memory as a realm for historical study is a relatively recent development in 
modern scholarship, and much of the research in this field relies heavily on 
historiography, and for the study of memory in France this includes historiography 
surrounding the Holocaust and World War II. For the purpose of this thesis, selected 
works of Pierre Nora and Henry Rousso form the historiographical foundation for 
analysis of recent historical traumas in France. Specifically Rousso’s theory of a “Vichy 
Syndrome” supplemented by Nora’s concept of lieux de mémoire—“sites” of memory—
have shaped my research and the arguments herein relate back to these theories.1 Using 
this framework, I attempt to situate my findings within the larger study of memory and 
the complexities of “writing trauma.”2 I inevitably had to make selections for which 
components of the Vichy Syndrome to address, both for clarity’s sake and because the 
French memory of modern conflicts and traumas extends into more issues than I can 
discuss in a single thesis.
As a result, it is important to define the Vichy Syndrome as Rousso envisions it 
and explain how this “syndrome” is treated within the framework of this thesis. He 
describes it as a national French obsession with the memory of France’s Vichy and 
Occupation period and argues that this obsession began in the 1970s and 1980s and 
continues to this day.3 The Syndrome does not let this past pass because of the guilt or the 
                                                
1 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Pierre Nora, ed., Realms of 
Memory: Rethinking the French Past, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), vol. 1.
2 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001).
3 Eric Conan and Henry Rousso, Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas (Paris: Libraire Arthème 
Fayard/Pluriel, 2013).
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culpability French citizens and the French government feel for all that occurred during 
the era of the Vichy Regime between 1940 and 1944. This guilt led to the creation and 
popularization of the idea of a devoir de mémoire, or duty to remember. The Syndrome 
encompasses this obsession, guilt, and “duty to remember” in addition to later public 
events and commemorations that have occured as a result of these factors. Such events 
include the trials of collaborators forty and fifty years after the fall of Vichy, the creation 
of museums and memorials, commemorative ceremonies, discovery of new sources 
dealing with the period, and the call for the “liberation” of archives—essentially all the 
lieux de mémoire of the period. In the following work, I do not address all the activities 
that result from the Syndrome that Rousso describes, but focus on the concepts of 
obsession, guilt, devoir de mémoire, and the resulting over-commemoration in official 
recognitions. I ignore the wider debates about the use of archives and the role of the 
historian. I also focus on the Syndrome solely within the context of the Holocaust in 
France, ignoring other historical groups, figures, and events like Pétain and the French 
Resistance. To show the influence of the Vichy Syndrome, however, I also discuss how 
the commemoration of other injustices toward Algerians differs from the memory of 
Holocaust victims. The contrasting memories of the Holocaust and the Algerian War 
suggest the significance of the perspectives that Rousso has developed.
Walking around Paris, it is hard to avoid the repetitive commemoration of the 
Vichy period. Depending on the neighborhood, one might see one or more of the 
following on nearly every block: monuments, museums, plaques outside every primary 
school, streets named for tragic events or well-known victims and heroes, and gardens 
dedicated to the same. And one finds this not only in the city of light, but around the 
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entire nation though perhaps not quite to the same extent as in Paris. In addition, these 
tangible sites do not exhaust the commemoration of the Vichy period, as other memorial 
experiences of the past can also be “sites” of memory; Rousso documents four “carriers” 
of memory: official, like those listed above as well as official ceremonies; organizational, 
meaning “organizations” or groups that “[preserve] and [unify] the personal memories of 
group members”; cultural, which include literature, art, and other media; and scholarly, 
meaning works created by scholars within an academic context.4 Pierre Nora does not 
refer specifically to Rousso’s Vichy Syndrome, but he essentially defines all of these 
“carriers” of memory, as lieux de mémoire. Lieux de mémoire are “fundamentally 
vestiges, the ultimate embodiments of a commemorative consciousness that survives in a 
history which, having renounced memory, cries out for it.”5 They can be any number of 
tangible and intangible things that result from a “will to remember,” like “museums, 
archives, cemeteries, collections, festivals, anniversaries, treaties, depositions, 
monuments, sanctuaries, [and] private associations.”6 To analyze the wide influence of 
the Vichy Syndrome, I turn to specific lieux de mémoire as essentially case studies in the 
changing relationship between history and memory. As Pierre Nora states on this 
changing, or rather already changed, relationship: “...during the upheavals of the modern 
world, experienced so acutely by France, a decisive shift was under way, from an 
awareness of self in history to an awareness of self in memory...[this transformation] has 
permitted, justified, and even necessitated systematic research into the lieux and the 
                                                
4 Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome, 219-221.
5 Nora, Realms of Memory, 1:6.
6 Ibid., 6 & 14.
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symbols of identity.”7 This kind of research into sites of memory thus provides the 
foundation for my analysis of how the French have remembered traumatic events that 
took place between the 1930s and the 1970s.
At the end of Rousso’s Vichy Syndrome, he asks if the Vichy Syndrome is a 
“hereditary” and “incurable” disease. Perhaps this is true, so that over time it just 
“diffuses” again and again—as he describes how it did over several decades after the war. 
It diffuses not only in the different ways it affects the different social groups that were 
most directly or indirectly involved in that period of history, but also in its affects on 
those involved in other particularly traumatic periods of French history; it permeates the 
memory of other past events. After Vichy, for example, what is more traumatic and 
controversial in modern French history than the events and memories of the Algerian 
War? Vichy and the Occupation occupy a particular space—and a large one, at that—in 
the French memory, which means that its “Syndrome” can alter or distort memories of 
other painful events, especially those of the Algerian War. 
The consequences of the Vichy Syndrome are particularly important for memories 
of the Algerian War not simply because one could classify this conflict as France’s 
greatest postwar trauma, but also because some of the injustices during the Algerian War 
took place in specific historical spaces where the World War II-era oppression of Jews 
occurred. The recognition of these overlapping historical spaces was new to me, though 
connections between the groups interned in these lieux are not entirely new to the study 
of France, Algeria, and memory and history; in an interview with Yad Vashem in 1998, 
Dominick LaCapra acknowledged the link between “Vichy” and the Algerian War stating 
                                                
7 Pierre Nora, ed., Rethinking France: Les Lieux de mémoire, trans. Mary Trouille (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1:xxi.
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that “the French concern with Vichy is a way of displacing anxiety about Algeria and its 
aftermath.”8 In his work Multidirectional Memory, Michael Rothberg also posited that 
“the Holocaust has played a crucial role in response to [the 1961 massacre of Algerians in 
France] from the very start,” and that “the practice of torture and the use of detention 
camps by France in its war against the Algerian independence movement provided 
triggers that stimulated remembrance of the Nazi occupation and genocide.”9 Jim House 
and Neil MacMaster also noted the similarities between the round up of Jews in 1942 
during the famous rafle du Vélodrome d’Hiver and the 1961 massacre of Algerians in 
Paris.10 Thus I am not the first to note these links and differences in French historical 
memories, but the connections are still a fairly new realization on the part of historians; 
and there has been very little in-depth research on the specific relationship between 
Algeria and Vichy.
To further explore the Vichy Syndrome and its manifestations, I have therefore 
focused on various lieux de mémoire that are shared between Algerian War-related events 
and Vichy and Occupation events, specifically those tied to Jewish and Algerian 
internments. In the first chapter, I set out to determine the present state of the Vichy 
Syndrome—noting an obsession and guilt that results in what Rousso calls “over-
commemoration” in regards to Jewish internment. Two lieux de mémoire make up the 
foundation for this chapter: the Camp des Milles and the Camp de Drancy. Both of these 
places became sites of national commemoration in 2012, revealing the contemporary 
                                                
8 LaCapra, Writing History, 171.
9 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of 
Decolonization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 228; see chapter two of my 
thesis for further information on the 1961 massacre.
10 Jim House and Neil MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 34; see chapter two of my thesis for further information on the 
rafle du Vélodrome d’Hiver.
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continuation of the Vichy Syndrome. The first chapter describes the history of how these 
places near Paris and in southern France developed into Jewish internment camps and 
then tracks the changes in their later official commemorations. I analyze changing French 
identifications with and feelings of responsibility for the Vichy and Occupation period 
from the beginning of the Vichy Syndrome to the present and shed light on the 
contemporary condition of the Vichy Syndrome as it relates to the specific period for 
which it was named.
The second chapter examines two events, the rafle du Vélodrome d’Hiver and the 
1961 massacre of Algerians in Paris, that share one location—the Vélodrome d’Hiver—
and an important historical figure—Maurice Papon. Firstly, this chapter covers the 
histories of these two events and notes their similarities. Secondly, it discusses the two 
trials of Maurice Papon. In the first trial, he was charged with crimes against humanity 
for his role in the deportation of Jews, and in the second, Papon himself brought a 
defamation suit against historian Jean-Luc Einaudi shortly after Papon’s trial for crimes 
against humanity trial. In this later trial, the legal arguments focused on Einaudi’s public 
statement that Papon killed hundreds of Algerians during the 1961 massacre. Lastly, this 
chapter examines the official commemoration of the rafle and the massacre. Through 
analysis of these three different phases in the history of lieux de mémoire, I intend to 
discover how other memories, specifically those related to the Algerian War, can 
complicate the Vichy Syndrome and French commemorations of the persecution of Jews 
during World War II.
The third and final chapter looks at one site—the Camp Joffre de Rivesaltes. This camp 
in southern France interned various groups of people, including Jews during World War 
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II and Algerians both during and after the Algerian War. The chapter expands the 
examples in earlier chapters by presenting an historical overview of the camp and then 
analyzing the commemoration of the site as a conflicted lieu de mémoire due to its 
historical associations for two different groups. The Vichy Syndrome led to its 
recognition as place of Jewish internment, and these connections with the Holocaust 
complicate the other events that happened there and the memories of other persecuted 
groups. In this last chapter, I identify the difficulties that the Vichy Syndrome can pose 
for non-Vichy, non-Occupation memories and different identities, especially among 
French-Algerians. It is important to note that this chapter does not mean to evaluate this 
camp through the lens of comparative victimhood, something that historians should 
avoid. I simply mean to evaluate the complicating effects that the Vichy Syndrome has 
on historical memories among various social groups that share a common memory site. 
The goal of this thesis as a whole is to describe and analyze the complexities of Henry 
Rousso’s important concept of a Vichy Syndrome, and I use the history of memory to 
better understand how both national identities and more specific group identities have 
evolved through the events and commemorations of traumatic experiences. The French 
history of memory and forgetting suggests broader patterns in the construction of modern 
collective identities, for all nations struggle with confrontation of traumas in their own 
histories as they simultaneously attempt to maintain unity.
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Camp des Milles and Camp de Drancy: The Vichy Syndrome and contemporary 
collective commemoration
This first chapter contextualizes and analyzes the contemporary situation of the 
Vichy Syndrome in France by examining two sites: the Camp des Milles in southern 
France and Camp de Drancy in a Parisian suburb. These two camps now share a similar 
historical role because they both have large, curated memorial sites as of September 
2012, when memorials were inaugurated within 11 days of each other.1 Their main 
difference lies in their historical administration during World War II—the Camp des 
Milles was a Vichy, “free zone” internment camp and Drancy was a Nazi, occupied zone 
internment camp run by French police. The first two sections of this chapter examine the 
histories of these sites, specifically during their time as places of Jewish internment. The 
final sections examine commemoration of the sites and demonstrate their significance for 
Henry Rousso’s concept of a “Vichy Syndrome” by showing how it has yet to come to 
end.
I. Le Camp des Milles: The Three Phases of Internment
Not long after the war began in 1939, France created “camps de rassemblement,” 
where they interned “enemy subjects.”2 These “enemy subjects” were mainly German 
and Austrian immigrants, citizens, and expatriates.3 A great majority of these individuals 
were Jewish, having fled the Reich because of anti-Semitic policies, or non-Jews who 
                                                
1 François Béguin, Le Monde, 12 September 2012; Scott Sayare, The New York Times, 21 
September 2012.
22 Marcel Cohen et al., Les Camps en Provence : exil, internement, déportation, 1933-1944 (Aix-
en-Provence : Editions Alinéa et L.L.C.G., 1984), in André Fontaine’s chapter “L’Internement au 
Camp des Milles et dans ses annexes: Septembre 1939-Mars 1943,” 106; La Fondation du Camp 
des Milles, “Site-mémorial du Camp des Milles-comprendre pour demain” (Aix-en-Provence: 
Exprimer, 2012), 6.
33 La Fondation du Camp des Milles, “Site-mémorial,” 6.
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generally disagreed with Hitler’s politics.4 Essentially, one could classify many of them 
as political refugees. The French government, however, saw them only as a security 
threat to the nation and therefore interned them in these camps de rassemblement. The 
Camp des Milles, located in the south of France just outside of Aix-en-Provence, was one 
such camp for a time, opening in September of 1939. The first group of internees arrived 
at the former tile factory on September 7th and the camp closed as a camp de 
rassemblement just over seven months later in late April 1940.5 French authorities 
subsequently transferred the internees from the former tilery to a former canning factory 
in Lambesc, another small town in Aix-en-Provence.
Front view of the tile factory known as the Camp des Milles in les Milles, France. (Photo my 
own, June 2013)
                                                
4 Robert Mencherini, Provence-Auschwitz: De l’internement des étrangers à la déportation des 
juifs (1939-1944) (Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l’Université de Provence, 2007), in 
Mencherini’s chapter, “De la galaxie des Milles aux rafles de juifs en Provence,” 16.
5 Cohen et al., Les Camps en Provence, 108 & 120.
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During the first phase of its history as an internment camp, the Camp des Milles 
housed many famous figures. Prominent among them was the German-Jewish writer Lion 
Feuchtwanger, ironically famous at that time for his work Jud Süß, which the Nazis 
appropriated and made into an anti-Semitic film. Other well-known internees included: 
artist Hans Bellmer; artist “Wols”, or Alfred Otto Wolfgang Schulze; artist Max Ernst; 
author Walter Benjamin; Nobel Prize winning scientist Otto Meyerhof; Nobel Prize 
winner and inventor of Cortisone, Thadeus Reichstein; son of Thomas Mann, Golo 
Mann; and first violinist of the Vienna Philharmonic at the time, Fritz Brunner.6 Historian 
André Fontaine wrote of the unhygienic conditions of the camp, and noted the irony of 
these conditions when several of the internees were doctors, including two—Meyerhof 
and Reichstein—who won the Nobel Prize for their advancements in the medical field.7
Lion Feuchtwanger wrote an autobiographical novel about his time at the Camp des 
Milles, called Der Teufel in Frankreich, or The Devil in France, in which he describes 
the terrible conditions internees like himself suffered between September 1939 and April 
1940. 
Not only did they have substandard healthcare, they had very little access to water 
and the food was insufficient. Feuchtwanger wrote: “Water was scarce, and camp 
authorities themselves affirmed that in the entire tilery, only a single tap produced 
drinkable water, and even that water seemed dubious to [the internees].”8 Everyday, they 
                                                
6 Ibid., 115-116 and 118-119, André Fontaine includes a more comprehensive list of well-known 
internees in these pages, as well as in his work Le Camp d’étrangers des Milles 1939-1940 (Aix-
en-Provence) (Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1989); La Fondation du Camp des Milles, “Site-
mémorial,” 15.
7 Cohen et al., Les Camps en Provence, 109.
8 Lion Feuchtwanger, Le Diable en France, trans. Jean-Claude Capèle (Paris: Belfond, 2010), 39.
13
ate with the same unclean aluminum utensils and bowls.9 They received a decent amount 
of food at the time—the same amount as the soldiers, which included around 370 g of 
meat each day.10 However, they ate mostly starches rather than a variety of foods, leading 
to nutrient and vitamin deficiencies.11 This food was often covered in dust and dirt as a 
result of the earthen floors and the brick dust from the tile factory. According to 
Feuchtwanger, some of the internees often cited Faust at mealtimes: “[You] will eat the 
dust, and with an art.”12 Ironically enough, the internees put on a production of Faust at 
the camp under the direction of Friedrich Schramm.13 They also lived in cramped, 
crowded conditions and had limited access to toilets. There were seven latrines, and at 
any given time, there were lines of at least ten internees waiting in front of each one.14
Many internees resorted to urinating in any corner near the latrines because they could 
not wait any longer. Thus, “this entire area of the camp,” right in the middle of the 
picturesque French provincial countryside, “resembled a swamp.”15 God and the Devil 
lived in France together at this time, side by side, as Feuchtwanger shows in his account.
With the establishment of the Vichy regime in June of 1940, the camp reopened, 
this time as an official internment camp, not a “camp de rassemblement” that generally 
functioned as an internment camp but under a different name.16 The French government 
of the “Free zone” imprisoned indésirables at this camp and many others.17 Jews, both 
                                                
9 Ibid., 77.
10 Cohen et al., Les Camps en Provence, 110.
11 Ibid.
12 Feuchtwanger, Le Diable en France, 77.
13 André Fontaine, Le Camp d’étrangers des Milles 1939-1943 (Aix-en-Provence) (Aix-en-
Provence : Edisud, 1989), 56.
14 Ibid., 65.
15 Ibid., 66-67.
16 La Fondation du Camp des Milles, “Site-mémorial,” 6.
17 Ibid.
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French and not, made up a large part of this “undesirable” category, along with 
immigrants from all across Europe that found themselves within French borders. The 
Vichy regime interned many of the same individuals previously interned by the French 
Republic, including Lion Feuchtwanger, but for different reasons; the French Republic 
interned them because of their German or other Axis-power nationalities while the Vichy 
regime interned most of them because of their “othered” identity as purely immigrants—
non-French—or Jews.18 Both governments, however, named and defined these groups as 
enemies of the state. For the Vichy regime, painting these groups as threats to the nation 
legitimized their decisions to arrest and intern them—something simple hate, anti-
Semitism, and racism alone could not justify.
During this second phase, les Milles operated as a transit camp.19 Vichy police 
arrested undesirables and took to them to the camp where they stayed until transportation 
arrived to take them back to their supposed countries of origin.20 Thus, the Vichy regime 
sent many individuals back to the same nations they recently fled due to persecution. 
Beyond Eastern, Southern, and Central Europeans, this second phase group included 
Spanish immigrants who wanted to escape Franco’s dictatorial rule.21 The camp housed 
anywhere between 800 and 1400 people during this phase, which lasted from July 1940 
to July 1942. The majority were men between the ages of 15 and 65. Women and 
children numbered less than thirty some months and up to approximately 350 during 
                                                
18 Some of those interned were actual “threats” to the regime as active resisters and political 
dissenters, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, or religion. The majority, however, were these 
social “undesirables.”
19 La Fondation du Camp des Milles, “Site-mémorial,” 6.
20 Mencherini, Provence-Auschwitz, 19.
21 Ibid., 21.
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others.22 Many worked in Groupes de travailleurs étrangers (GTE), or “groups of foreign 
workers,” which the Vichy regime exploited for free manual labor, using them in the 
mining, forestry, agricultural, and industrial sectors. The government often detained 
internees who procured visas to other non-Axis countries so that they could continue to 
use them to this end.23
Prisoners during this period suffered even worse conditions than those interned in 
les Milles when it operated as a camp de rassemblement. It was more crowded and the 
internees received less food. They now received 250 grams of bread, 2 grams of fat, 2-3 
grams of sugar, and 15 grams of meat per day.24 Due to crowded conditions, multiple 
people lived in each of the tilery’s former brick ovens.25 The internees called them 
“catacombs”—die Katakombe—because they were cramped, almost completely devoid 
of all light, and cold.26 As a result of unhygienic conditions, vermin infested the camp 
and many people fell ill. At least one person committed suicide—a man named Walter 
Hasenclever, who wrote his autobiography before he died, which he called Die 
Rechtslosen, literally translating to “rights or liberty-less”, perhaps better translated as 
“the oppressed”.27
The situation worsened and more people took their lives as the camp entered a 
new phase and became a deportation camp in August of 1942, less than a month after the 
well-known “rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv’” in the occupied zone—a large “round-up” of Jews in 
                                                
22 Ibid., 20-21.
23 Ibid., 22-23.
24 Fontaine, Le Camp d’étrangers des Milles, 104.
25 Ibid., 227.
26 Galerie d’Art, Espace 13, Des Peintres au Camp des Milles, septembre 1939-été 1941: Hans 
Bellmer, Max Ernst, Robert Liebknecht, Leo Marschütz, Ferdinand Springer, Wols (Aix-en-
Provence: Actes Sud, 1997), 25.
27 Ibid., 12.
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Paris that the Vichy regime helped plan.28 The camp changed to a site of deportation due 
to the Bousquet-Knochen agreement between Vichy and the Reich that stated that the 
Vichy police would round up and hand over 10,000 Jews to the Germans.29 On August 9th
and 10th, the French police separated the 72 children internees aged 2 to 18 years from 
their parents and transported—not deported—them to other places nearby.30 Laval 
declared a month earlier that they should also deport children, which the government put 
into action only a few days after this separation at les Milles.31
Later in the afternoon of the 10th, the police ordered all internees whose last 
names began with any letter between A through H to assemble in the courtyard, 
numbering 262 in total.32 There they waited for hours. Many fainted and sixteen people 
attempted suicide.33 Two succeeded, including one woman who jumped out of a third 
floor window with her two babies in her arms.34 After several hours of standing in the 
late summer sun, the police forced the internees onto the train waiting to deport them, 
pushing them with the butts of their rifles.35 They spent all night in the stationary train in 
these cramped conditions with only one pitcher of water per car and a “slop bucket” in 
which to relieve themselves.36 The train left les Milles at 8:00 am the next morning. More 
left the camp in train cars the next day, and 542 followed on the 13th of August.37 This 
continued throughout August and into September, when the camp ceased its operation as 
                                                
28 See the next chapter for more details on the rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv.
29 Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auschwitz: Le role de Vichy dans la Solution finale de la question juive 
en France-1942 (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 90.
30 Fontaine, Le Camp d’étrangers des Milles, 143-144.
31 Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auschwitz, 140.
32 Fontaine, Le Camp d’étrangers des Milles, 230.
33 Ibid., 144-145.
34 Ibid., 145.
35 Ibid., 145 & 231.
36 Ibid., 147 & 231.
37 Ibid., 148-149.
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a site of deportation.38 Most of the over 2,000 people who left les Milles in train cars did 
not survive, ending up at Auschwitz after brief stints at the French camps in Drancy 
and/or Rivesaltes.39 A few internees successfully hid themselves in the tilery and escaped 
deportation with the help of local French citizens.40 The last of the prisoners not deported 
in August and September left les Milles for other places in December 1942.41 After the 
war, the same tilery that saw such horrors reopened as a factory, as if nothing happened.42
II.  Le Camp de Drancy: The Two, or Three, Phases of Internment
Before receiving internees from les Milles and before its operation as an 
internment camp, the Drancy site—located in the Drancy suburb of Paris—was meant to 
be something commendable. Architects Eugène Beaudouin and Marcel Lods created the 
Cité de la Muette, as it was called, as part of the Republic’s attempt to provide 
comfortable, hygienic living arrangements for the working class, inspired by Ebenezer 
Howard’s “garden city” movement.43 They built cité de la Muette, or “silent city”, 
between 1931 and 1935 for workers as an affordable escape from the noisy, dirty inner 
city.44 Beginning in September 1939, its function took a sinister turn as the Republic 
requisitioned it and used the buildings for the internment of communists up until May 
1940.45 In June 1940, the Germans invaded Paris and used the cité de la Muette as a 
military barracks and transit point for French and British prisoners of war.46
                                                
38 La Fondation du Camp des Milles, “Site-mémorial,” 7.
39 Ibid.
40 Fontaine, Le Camp d’étranger des Milles, 145.
41 La Fondation du Camp des Milles, “Site-mémorial,” 7.
42 Oliver Bertrand, “Camp des Milles: ‘Parti sans laisser d’adresse’”, Libération, 10 July 2012.






One year later on the 20August 1941, the site became the camp de Drancy—an 
internment camp for Jews and immigrants in the occupied zone.47 From August 20 to 25, 
the French police arrested 5784 people and sent 4230 of them to Drancy.48 French 
policemen, not Nazi troops, committed this act and were also in charge of the camp.49 So 
began Drancy’s first phase as a camp de représailles, or “reprisal camp”—reprisal here 
referring to the idea that the imprisoned individuals wronged the state and therefore, as an 
act of reprisal, the French and Germans interned them. This period lasted from August 
1941 to June 1942.50 Internees stayed at the cité de la Muette for varying lengths of 
time—hours, days, weeks, a few months—before trains took them to other French 
internment camps like Beaune-la Rolande, Gurs, or Compiègne.51 Thus, it functioned 
primarily as a transit camp during this period.
Though the site’s original intent was to provide comfortable and hygienic living 
arrangements for its inhabitants, the camp resembled anything but this vision. The 
Fédération des Sociétés Juives de France reported on 20 November 1941 that the 
internees had to sleep on the reinforced concrete floors with pieces of wood as pillows. A 
few weeks later, they received beds, but without mattresses.52 Each day, prisoners 
received one small cup of black coffee as their breakfast, cold vegetable soup for lunch 
                                                
47 Serge Klarsfeld, Le Calendrier de la persecution des juifs de France 1940-1944 (Paris: Fayard, 
2001), 1:183. My own translation from French. For the original German of texts written by Nazi 
officers, see Serge Klarsfeld’s Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich; Deutsche 
Dokumente 1941-1944 (Paris: Klarsfeld, 1977).
48 Ibid., 1:183-184.
49 Ibid., 1:184.
50 Wieviorka and Laffitte, A l’Intérieur, 9.
51 Maurice Rajsfus, Drancy: Un camp de concentration très ordinaire 1941-1944 (Paris: le 
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and dinner, and 200 grams of bread.53 Many individuals lost a significant amount of 
weight during their time at Drancy. One person reported weighing 56 kilograms, or 
approximately 123 pounds, when she arrived, and left weighing a mere 39 kilograms, or 
approximately 86 pounds.54 Starvation was a serious issue for the camp during this time, 
especially during the fall of 1941. The meager food internees received often caused them 
to fall ill; one source reported 600 cases of dysentery at one time, resulting from the 
consumption of unwashed vegetables.55 La Fédération des Sociétés Juives de France also 
reported 600 cases of vitamin deficiency, listed 300 cases of tuberculosis, and detailed 
the lack of proper medical provisions including basic medications like aspirin and space 
for the sick—the infirmary consisted of only five stalls at that time.56 A great many other 
internees suffered from edema, which afflicted over 400 in November 1941.57 Apart from 
living alongside all of these sick, the internees experienced other hygiene issues, like 
women’s inability to use the bathroom facilities as needed due to a rule that only allowed 
groups of 10 women to use them at a time, meaning each woman could use an actual 
bathroom once every 36 hours since the camp housed thousands of internees.58
Some committed suicide out of desperation. A Jewish doctor at the camp “put an 
end to his days with phenobarbitone,” while another person threw himself out of a fifth 
floor window.59 Yet another tried to commit suicide by way of slitting the veins on his 
wrist, and some prisoners died not of their own accord, but of starvation due to an 
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insufficient amount of food.60 The guards and camp officials mistreated the interned, 
especially the French, who almost exclusively controlled and directed the camp 
themselves, despite its operation under Nazi rule. One person stated that it was often hard 
to determine where “German brutality” started and “French severity” left off,” while 
another stated, “The most severe were the French. The Germans simply carried out their 
orders, nothing more.”61 The French police mistreated women, in particular, often 
sexually harassing and assaulting them during frisking and interrogations.62 Head of the 
Sicherheitspolizei in occupied Paris, Helmut Knochen, lauded Frenchmen’s willingness 
to help accomplish Germany’s Final Solution goals during his trial in 1954, stating: “It is 
not the 2000 [German] officers at my disposal that would have allowed me to take 
France. It is because the police, the gendarmerie, and the French justice system helped 
me that I could accomplish the task ahead.”63
All of these factors led many internees who experienced Nazi concentration 
camps prior to their internment at the cité de la Muette to say that Drancy was more 
brutal than Dachau, or that “Dachau was a paradise compared to Drancy.”64 Animosity 
between “French” Jews and “foreigners” or “immigrants” further worsened the situation. 
Some French Jews, according to a prisoner, saw themselves as “superior” to other, non-
French internees.65 Another told of how they blamed the “foreigners” there for their 
problems, refused to fraternize with them, and believed that French Jews would soon be 
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liberated.66 In December of 1941, the French population at Drancy numbered 1046, 
followed closely by the Polish who made up 989 of the total.67 As the camp moved into 
its second phase, the imprisoned population included some famous figures, including 
Max Jacob, a well-known French poet and painter who was a close friend of Picasso. 
Compared to the Camp des Milles, the list of the famous interned at Drancy was quite
small. The number of people who went through Drancy at some point, however, 
regardless of social status, was much greater than the Camp des Milles ever saw. 
During the second phase, which never truly ended until the liberation of the camp, 
Drancy operated as a site of deportation. A total of 80,000 Jews passed through the camp 
and 67,073 of the 75,000 Jews deported from France to German concentration camps, 
primarily Auschwitz, left by trains from the station at Drancy.68 Less than three percent 
of those deported from the camp survived to see the end of the war.69 The first convoy 
left the cité de la Muette on March 27th, 1942.70 From this date until August 1944, the 
camp frequently received thousands of Jews from other French camps. This included 
trains full of children aged 2 to 18 who arrived in miserable states, infected with 
ringworm and scabies, and many could not walk. A Jewish doctor at the camp 
remembered their arrival and his attempts to help them by giving them what blankets they 
could find, only to discover the next morning that the adult internees had stolen them 
from the children.71 On the trains deporting Jews to concentration camps, these children 
traveled in livestock cars in the company of the elderly, the disabled, and the sick with 
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fevers of 102 degrees Fahrenheit or less.72 Among those deported children were those 
rounded up by Klaus Barbie, the “Butcher of Lyon”, from the famous “maison d’enfants” 
in Izieu.73
Though this second phase lasted until liberation, historians Annette Wieviorka 
and Michel Laffitte identify a third phase, in which they say Drancy operated as a 
concentration camp from July 1943 to August 1944.74 They see the appointment of SS 
Haupsturmführer Alois Brunner to the camp’s position of director in July 1943 as 
Drancy’s transition from a “transit camp” to a “concentration camp.” Brunner had 
previously served the Reich in Vienna, Berlin, and Thessaloniki, in all of which his job 
was to direct the deportation of tens of thousands of Jews to concentration camps across 
Europe.75 The reforms he made resulted in a system of discipline much like those of 
concentration camps, according to Wieviorka and Laffitte.76 This is quite a provocative 
statement, and other historians like Maurice Rajsfus believe it should be further explored 
as a component of the site’s commemoration. Regardless of whether the camp had two or 
three phases, it operated largely as a transit and deportation camp for the entirety of its 
existence. The camp closed on 18 August 1944, when it was liberated.77 Acting on his 
extreme dedication to the Final Solution, Brunner organized deportation up until the very 
day before liberation. Shortly thereafter it ironically became a site of internment for 
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collaborators, and after the war it resumed its original use as low-income, urban housing, 
again, as with the Camp des Milles, like nothing happened.78
III. Complicating the “devoir de mémoire”: Commemoration of the Camp de Drancy
There is no denying that Drancy was a terrible place; one internee appropriately 
called it the “antechamber of death.”79 Yet for many years, France denied the camp’s 
existence as a site of French collaboration with the Nazis in the Final Solution. Instead, 
the state chose to remember it falsely as a place where Germans mistreated and deported 
French citizens, never originally recognizing that the victims were mostly Jews.80 The 
French did, however, decide to call it a “concentration camp” as soon as the war ended, 
officially defining it as such in the Petit Robert and inscribing it in a commemorative 
plaque placed in one of the building’s stairwells.81 This plaque has a rather general 
inscription that avoids description of the interned, stating: “In this place, a concentration 
camp functioned from 1941 to 1944.”82 The state added others beside it by 1951, 
specifically dedicated to French prisoners of war that the Nazis assembled in the site’s 
courtyard to await deportation between June 1940 and August 1941.83 Here they 
identified internees as more than French—as French soldiers—but again refused to 
recognize the internees from August 1941 to June 1944 as mostly Jewish.
In 1965, the mayor of the Drancy suburb decided that the town should erect a 
“monument to the memory of the deported victims of Nazism who died after their 
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internment at the Drancy camp.”84 Here again it was not made clear that the majority of 
these victims were Jewish and interned because of their ethno-religious identity. 
However, the committee set up to choose the artist for the project selected a Jewish 
sculptor who created a monument full of Jewish symbolism, imagery, and language, 
showing a progression towards greater recognition of the site and all that occurred there. 
The artist, Shelomo Selinger, made the sculpture in such a way that “the three blocks at 
the paved base [of the monument] formed the Hebrew letter shin [ש]”—a letter that 
stands for “Shaddai”, or God. This letter is traditionally “engraved on mezuzah” which 
Jews place by the doors of their homes.85 The two opposing blocks that surround the 
central block represent the “doorway to death,” and the shin operates like a mezuzah, 
marking the entrance to this doorway.86 The central block is a tangled mass of 10 
individuals—the number of individuals “necessary for collective prayer (minyan).”87 One 
of the figures wears a tefillin, or phylactery, symbolizing prayer, and two of the figures 
whose heads are reversed symbolize death. A shoulder, arm, and beard of two people 
form the Hebrew letters lamed and vav, which translate to the number 36, the number of 
“Justes parmi les Nations,” who were individuals recognized for saving Jews from 
internment, deportation, and death in France.88 On one of the blocks, Selinger inscribed:
“August 20th, 1941, 5,000 Jews were arrested in Paris and assembled in this place, 
inaugurating the Drancy camp, antechamber of the death camps. Nearly 100,000 
Jews—men, women, children, and the elderly—were interned here before the 
majority of them were deported to Auschwitz. Only 1,518 returned. 256 were 
executed as hostages. This monument testifies to the Jewish martyrs of France, 







victims of Nazi barbarism. When you pass by, take a moment of silence and 
remember [n’oublie pas].”89
Selinger’s monument in the courtyard between the Drancy buildings that formerly housed many 
Jews awaiting deportation during World War II. (Photo my own, June 2013)
Selinger’s note that the Nazis committed these acts shows the reluctance of the 
nation to admit France’s culpability. The French were aware to some extent of citizens’ 
roles in the internment of Jews and other “undesirables” by the time the committee 
selected Selinger and most certainly by its inauguration in 1976, so this was not inscribed 
out of ignorance but denial.90 Selinger, a Holocaust survivor of nine different camps 
himself, very likely knew that the direction of the camp was mostly French and chose to 
                                                
89 Ibid., 335.
90 See chapter two for more on the development of official recognition during the 1970s, 
especially information about the presidential pardon of Touvier, a Frenchman involved in the 
deportation of Jews. It was in this decade that the Vichy Syndrome began, according to Rousso. 
Some, though not complete, discussion of the French role in the Holocaust made headlines and 
therefore the French citizenry knew about the nation’s involvement in the genocide to some 
extent by 1976.
26
omit this fact because of his work’s audience.91 The French political culture was not 
ready at this point to completely accept French involvement in the persecution of Jews.
In February of 1993, the French made their first step towards recognition of the 
state’s involvement when the Union of Jewish Students of France placed a fifth plaque at 
the site that reads: “Here, the French State of Vichy interned several thousand Jews, 
gypsies, and foreigners. They were deported to Nazi camps where nearly all of them died. 
We, as a generation of remembrance, will never forget.”92 Thus, the nation and its 
constituents officially recognized the role of Vichy in the Holocaust at this point, though 
the Vichy police was not actually present at this camp. Though in some ways it seemed a 
step towards complete recognition, in naming the Vichy regime as the perpetrator they 
attempted to separate the French Republic and its citizens from these events in order to 
escape blame for the many the postwar “Republican” citizens who were collaborators in 
the occupied and unoccupied zones during the war. Another example of this occurred in 
1988, when the state’s rail transportation organization (SNCF) donated a wagon like 
those previously used for deportations to Drancy’s memorial site, which they decided to 
do as a gesture of remembrance following the trial of the infamous Nazi and “Butcher of 
Lyon,” Klaus Barbie.93 They meant it to represent Nazi atrocities, and not French ones, 
despite the SNCF’s role in deporting those 67,073 individuals from the Drancy camp in 
train cars like the one they donated. The French public accused the organization of their 
complicity three years later in 1991, which the SNCF administration did not publicly 
admit until twenty years later in 2011.94 This shows the continuing reluctance of many 
                                                





French to confront the full reality of the country’s traumatic Holocaust past, and shows 
the slow development of historical memory in regards to this past that evolves in French 
collective memory to this day.
The first large, official, nationalistic commemoration occurred on May 12th, 1992. 
This ceremony emphasized the reality that Drancy was a site of mainly Jewish 
internment, as seen by the choice to have students perform songs in Yiddish and Hebrew, 
in addition to some in French, as well as the majority of the speakers’ identification as 
Jewish.95 At the end of the ceremony, all attendees sang la Marseillaise—the French 
national anthem—and the SNCF train car was illuminated in blue, white, and red, like the 
French flag.96 French citizens are supposed to pay their respects to the flag, especially 
during their national anthem, and by illuminating the train car in this way, French citizens 
were actively made to respect all the deported victims and the memory of the Holocaust.
The next large commemoration took place the next year on April 25th, 1993, the 
day after the “Journée nationale de la deportation,” a national day of remembrance 
created in 1954.97 This time, the commemoration focused on the plight of communists 
interned there under the Republic—something the event did not acknowledge—from 
1939 to 1940. The speakers present continuously affirmed the multitude of different 
groups interned and deported, stating that the “almost 100,000” internees at Drancy were 
Jews, gypsies, and foreigners.98 Although it is true that some gypsies and non-Jewish 
foreigners were interned in the camp, they made up a very small percentage of the total. 
This seemed like a step backwards from the previous commemoration, which fully 






realized the largely Jewish history of the camp. It was not a step back to a time when the 
internment and deportation of Jews were ignored or denied, but it did minimize the 
Jewish historical association to this camp, perhaps as an attempt unify citizens by 
refusing to focus mainly on one group of the population.
This commemorative service did recognize some French involvement in the 
arrests and deportations of Jews. However, the speakers falsely laid all the blame on the 
Vichy militia, stating that this militia of the unoccupied zone operated this camp located 
in the occupied zone.99 The nation seemed to agree on a “devoir de mémoire”—a duty to 
remember—but its constituents did not seem to know how to go about it, especially 
without feeling as if they might complicate national unity and pride by highlighting 
serious wrongs committed by citizens of the Republic. They wanted to place the blame 
on someone or something other than themselves or their fellow citizens, and they named 
Vichy as firstly non-French to separate themselves from its actions and then, with this 
comfort in mind, claimed the regime as the responsible party.
Recognition of French culpability occurred in 1995 when Jacques Chirac publicly 
admitted the nation’s role at the commemoration of the rafle du Vél’ d’hiv.100 Six years 
later in 2001, the cité de la Muette became an officially protected site of national 
memory, saving it from modifications that might damage any traces of its years of 
operation as an internment camp.101 On September 21st, 2012, the President of the 
Republic, François Hollande, officially inaugurated the museum erected just across the 
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street from Selinger’s monument and the SNCF train car.102 This marks the nation’s most 
recent effort to deal with the troubled past that largely revolves around this particular site. 
A refusal to fully recognize French involvement in the internment and deportation of 
Jews at this specific site has left the French state with a guilty conscience. In response to 
this guilt, the state originally obsessively commemorated, hoping for closure. Closure did 
not occur because the French did not acknowledge the true extent of French involvement 
in the Holocaust, and thus the obsession continued. By 2012, France continued to feel 
guilty though it had largely been recognized that French citizens, not non-French Vichy 
entities, led the camp. This guilt developed out of the previous denial and the idea that the 
country has a devoir de mémoire. 
A great deal of the difficulty in commemorating this specific site stems from the 
way France labeled it from the beginning—as a concentration camp, not simply an 
internment camp. As stated previously, historians Annette Wieviorka and Michel Laffitte 
define the three phases in the camp’s history: transit camp, deportation camp, and 
concentration camp. Another historian and Holocaust survivor, Maurice Rajsfus, believes 
Drancy was both a concentration camp and deportation camp from the beginning.103
Also, as mentioned above, the first plaque placed at the site called Drancy a
“concentration camp,” stating little else. Calling the site a concentration camp made it 
especially difficult for the French to recognize their own hand in its operation because 
that would mean they were as “bad as the Nazis.” It would mean they actually carried out 
the Final Solution themselves, not simply that they sent Jews to the Nazis and then the 
Nazis carried out the Final Solution. Another point of difficulty comes from the facts of 
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the camp: it was the single largest site of Jewish deportation in France. The Vélodrome 
d’hiver may be the key symbolic site of the Holocaust in France in the French collective 
memory, but Drancy is truly the key historic site representative of the Holocaust in 
France. For these reasons, this site in particular continues the French over-
commemoration of the Holocaust and the Vichy period, called the Vichy Syndrome by 
historian Henry Rousso. Psychologically, the over-commemoration symptomatic of the 
Syndrome is a result of the national guilt associated with the reality of French 
involvement and the attempt at denying this reality. Drancy shows this guilt and over-
commemoration has yet to come to an end with the recent inauguration of a memorial 
museum dedicated to the camp’s history and memory.
V. Selective commemoration and misplaced association: Commemoration of the Camp 
des Milles
From 1942 to 1982, France did not commemorate the Camp des Milles in any 
great capacity.104 One might attribute this to the fact that throughout this period the site 
was privately owned and in a small city, unlike Drancy whose buildings are state-owned 
and located in a densely populated suburb of Paris. In 1982, the owner of the former 
camp planned to do some reconstructive work on the factory, which would include 
destroying a very important artistic remnant from the site’s operation as a place of 
internment—the “Salle des peintures murales,” or the “Mural room.”105 Jewish artists 
painted large-scale murals on the walls of this particular room during their internment. 
The Conseil Représentatif des Institutions juives de France and the mayor of the city-
commune Aix-en-Provence that includes les Milles intervened to save these historic 
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works of art by rushing the room’s classification as an official historic monument of 
France.106 It was not until 1985, however, that the community placed a plaque at the site 
commemorating the Jews interned there during World War II. This followed the creation 
of the “Comité de coordination pour la sauvegarde du Camp des Milles et la création 
d’un Musée mémorial de la Déportation, de la Résistance et de l’Internement”—the 
“coordinating committee for the conservation of the Camp des Milles and for the creation 
of a memorial Museum of Deportation, Resistance, and Internment.”107 This plaque 
states, like one of Drancy’s, that the deportation of Jews occurred at the hands of the 
Vichy government. Unlike Drancy, this was true for the Camp des Milles. However, one 
could argue that it was again used as a way to avoid fully admitting that the people who 
committed these acts were French before, during, and after the war.
The next commemorative action occurred in 1992 when the SNCF donated a train 
car like those used to deport Jews to the site, which was placed by the plaque across the 
street from the actual camp.108 Thus, the SNCF donated a train car to the Camp des 
Milles just as it did to the Camp de Drancy and, more significantly, they donated this 
particular wagon one year following public accusations of the organization’s complicity 
in the deportation of Jews. The ceremony following the donation of the train car was 
quite a large event called “Mémoire pour demain”—“memory/remembrance for 
tomorrow.”109 During this event, thousands of students attended to engage in debate 
about the Holocaust, and to view films, plays, and exhibitions about it, as well. It was a 
large, all-day, nationalistic, educational experience to which most public school field trips 






cannot compare. This is evidence of Rousso’s Vichy Syndrome concept—a, what he 
might call, over-commemoration and over-teaching of this specific historical event and 
time period. No event like it occurred to teach students about other periods in French 
history. As with commemoration at Drancy, this event at les Milles seemed to function as 
an outlet for the guilt felt for French involvement in the event and, at this point in time, 
for the guilt that stemmed from a refusal to completely acknowledge this involvement.
In 1993, one year following “Mémoire pour demain”, the Salle des peintures 
murales opened to the public.110 Nearly ten years later in 2002, citizens established 
another organization to push for the creation of a memorial museum—the “Mémoire du 
Camp d’Aix-des-Milles.”111 Two years after that in 2004, the entire factory and site of the 
former camp became an official historical monument, and over the next five years, the 
Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah—the “Foundation for the memory of the 
Holocaust”—raised the funds necessary to purchase the site.112 After they purchased it, 
another organization was created—the “Fondation du Camp des Milles- Mémoire et 
Education”—and three years later on September 10th, 2012, Prime Minister Jean-Marc 
Ayrault inaugurated the “Site-Mémorial du Camp des Milles.”113
This memorial is particularly important because although the Camp des Milles 
was largely ignored in official memory until the 1980s, whereas other sites—namely 
Drancy and the Vélodrome d’Hiver—were officially commemorated via ceremony or 
plaques not long after the war ended, it was the first memorial museum in France 
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dedicated to commemorating an internment camp.114 The Mémorial de la Shoah—the 
national Holocaust museum—opened only seven years prior. Perhaps one reason why the 
Vichy Syndrome developed over the 70s, 80s, 90s, and into the 2000s is because France 
had yet to provide victims with a lieu de mémoire where they could remember and 
mourn, and where others could learn about and from their struggles. Thus, the 
preoccupation with the Holocaust memory in France developed because this memory was 
so long effaced. In such a nationalistic country, lieux de mémoire are very important to 
national unity and national mourning. It makes sense that the French victims of the 
Holocaust would want their nation to recognize their struggle, and specifically the death 
of Jewish citizens, in the form of tangible sites when their nation places such great 
emphasis on memorials—like the “Tomb of the Unknown Soldier” under the Arc de 
Triomphe, Fort Mont Valérien, or the Panthéon. How could the Vichy Syndrome end 
without a final resting place for the French Holocaust dead, for the French Holocaust 
memory?
The Vichy Syndrome did not end with the creation of this site, however. Some 
sites act as places to leave the national memory of an event until the country is ready to 
pick it back up again on days of remembrance. This may be the case with events that fit 
more comfortably with the national narrative and that are long past, like World War I. 
However, one could argue that in some ways, there was a World War I Syndrome in 
France after the conflict ended, evident especially in post-World War I literature, and, in 
addition, that World War II distracted from mourning and remembrance and therefore 
one could not know how long the nation would have attempted to deal with this past. 
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After all, the Great War was unlike anything the world had ever seen. Though the 
Holocaust and World War I cannot be truly compared, they are similar in that they 
remain difficult to comprehend because they were so destructive and so many people 
perished. The Holocaust was especially shocking; it seems impossible that the Nazis—
and the French to some degree—could be capable of such acts. Thus, it is understandable 
that countries still struggle with the memory of it today. How does one deal with such a 
past? The Camp des Milles memorial asks such questions at the end of the museum tour 
in the “Volet réflexif”—“Reflective section.”115 Here, the nation tries to comprehend this 
past by using it as an example of what not to do, and showing that commemoration is 
important because through it, people can learn to resist repressive actions.
There exists a principal difference between commemorating a past like World 
War I in France and commemorating the Holocaust. World War I commemoration is not 
divisive like commemoration of the Holocaust in France. The Great War unifies all 
citizens against an oppressive force, while French persecution of Jews divides the nation 
because it goes against the core principles of the Republic—liberté, égalité, and fraternité 
for each and every citizen. France struggles with a paradox of desiring unity, explaining 
the original reluctance to admit the actions of Frenchmen against fellow citizens, and 
wanting to uphold its commitment to human rights for all people. Because of this 
paradox, sites related to divisive traumatic events like the Holocaust do not provide a 
“final resting place” for related memories. Such is the condition of the Vichy Syndrome. 
If it were to end, closure would not come from sites born of a guilty national conscience 
that does not allow for closure but in fact perpetuates obsessive remembrance. As Rousso 
states, France’s current Syndrome struggle that leads to over-commemoration is the 
                                                
115 La Fondation du Camp des Milles, “Site-mémorial,” 33.
35
nation’s difficulty in accepting “that it must live with a rupture that no trial, 
commemoration or speech can redress.”116
One important point to recognize in France’s remembrance of the Camp des Milles, in 
particular, is the focus on the site’s famous internees, most especially the artists. As 
explained in the section detailing the history of the camp, nearly all of these individuals 
were interned during the site’s first phase as a camp de rassemblement, when the 
Republic interned enemies of the state from the fall of 1939 to the summer of 1940. In 
fact, all of the best-known artists—Hans Bellmer, Max Ernst, Robert Liebknecht, Leo 
Marschütz, Ferdinand Springer, and Wols—were interned solely during this period, not 
during its operation as an internment camp that connected it to the Holocaust.117 This is 
an interesting fact considering the museum’s emphasis on these artists and their art as 
part of the Holocaust narrative in France. Their internment at les Milles and the art they 
created there do not represent the typical experiences of Jews in France and, more 
specifically, the purpose of this camp after the armistice between Vichy and the Reich. 
One wonders how commemoration would differ if these artists had not been interned 
there—would the museum even exist? After all, the first part of the site that France made 
an effort to save and declare an historical monument was the Salle des peintures murales. 
The art seemed, at least in the beginning, most important to the state, as opposed to 
remembrance of all internees’ experiences there as a whole, by its original decision to 
claim it as historical, and not the entire site where atrocities actually occurred. That they 
would also choose to use this art in a way that attributes it to the camp’s operation as a 
site implicated in the Final Solution complicates commemoration, as well. The art is 
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moving and worth viewing, but it does not compare to the terrors other internees 
experienced after these artists left. This is a contemporary example of how the state has 
yet to fully commemorate the Holocaust in France in a way true to its history. The Vichy 
Syndrome has not ended, and may not considering the nation still has difficulties 
comprehending and explaining all that occurred not just from 1940 to 1944, but also 
internment under the Third Republic in 1939.
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Rafles and Ratonnades: The Vichy Syndrome and Police Repression of Jews and 
Algerians
The first chapter showed that the Vichy Syndrome has yet to end by examining 
two camps recently christened as sites of memory—the Camp de Drancy and the Camp 
des Milles. This second chapter concerns two events—two intangible sites of memory 
that share a connection through one person. These two events are the “rafle du 
Vélodrome d’Hiver,” the infamous round-up of Jews in Paris by French police in 1942 
that has garnered international attention in the last few years with the publication of 
Tatiana de Rosnay’s bestseller Sarah’s Key, and the “ratonnade d’octobre,” the infamous 
massacre of Algerians by French police during a peaceful protest in 1961. Maurice 
Papon, secretary general of the Gironde police prefecture during World War II and chief 
of the Parisian police during the Algerian War, gave direct orders in both instances that 
led to the killing of many innocent people and he organized both in similar ways. Despite 
these events’ similarities in execution, the French do not commemorate them in the same 
ways; the massacre is hardly commemorated while the rafle is constantly remembered. 
Through analysis of these two histories, the legal prosecution of Maurice Papon, and the 
commemoration of the events, this chapter will demonstrate how France’s failure to 
officially recognize the October massacre in fact perpetuates the over-commemoration of 
the rafle and the Vichy Syndrome, in general.
I. The Rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv
July 16, 1942, Paris, France, two days after the anniversary of the once-unified 
country’s Fête nationale. The “rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv” began before dawn in the 
arrondissements and banlieues of Paris. Starting at 4:00 AM, French policemen arrested 
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Jewish men, women, and children, forcing them from their homes onto buses that led 
them to the Vélodrome d’Hiver, a cycling race track just a few blocks from the Eiffel 
Tower. In his work Paris, 1942: Chroniques d’un survivant, Maurice Rajsfus, a French 
historian and survivor of the round-up, tells how police knocked on his family’s door 
early that morning, telling them to pack their bags, constantly reminding them to “hurry 
up”.1 The policemen stopped at 9:30 AM, beginning again at 12:00 PM and ending the 
day at 3:30 PM. They started at 4:00 AM the following morning and continued to make 
arrests until 1:00 PM.
In only eighteen hours over two days, the French police rounded up—“raflé”—
13,152 Jews.2 Of these 13,152 people, only 3,118 of them were men. The majority were 
women (5,919) and children (4,115).3 The Director of the Municipal Police stated these 
figures in a letter to the Prefect of Police on 20July 1942. His figures differed from those 
of S.S. officer Lischka from a few days earlier. Lischka recorded 12,884 arrests in a letter 
to the German Military Commander in France on 18July.4 The French arrested so many 
people, that it seemed no one quite knew the exact number. Buses took these Jews to the 
Vélodrome d’Hiver. The police sent around 2,000 men and 3,000 women to Drancy, the 
internment camp in the Drancy suburb—or “banlieue”—of Paris, upon their arrival at the 
Vél’ d’Hiv. The approximately 7,000 others remained at the track.5
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The Jews who did not go to Drancy immediately after arrival at the Vél’ d’Hiv 
remained at the track for days. The French police planned to send 2,000 of them to the 
Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande internment camps by convoy between July 19and 22.6
By 22 July, the Vélodrome d'Hiver was empty. The Cabinet of the Police Prefecture 
stated ironically, in retrospect, an hour before the last group of Jews left the track, "In 
about an hour the Vélodrome d'Hiver will be free."7 During these five days, internees 
lived in terrible conditions. Internee Ryfka-Régine Wolf-Rybak stated that for three days,
she and her son did not eat or drink, and explained how people began to lose their minds.8
She specifically told of a woman who reposed undressed, thinking she was in her 
bedroom, ready to go to bed.9 A nurse phoned the Police Prefecture on 17July, a mere
one day after the arrival of the first groups of arrested Jews, requesting basic needs like 
blankets so people could sleep, basins for washing, and toilets, of which, she stated, the 
internees were in great need.10 Another person from an organization providing aid to the 
internees also contacted the Prefecture, alerting them of the situation at the Vél' d'Hiv on 
18July. He stated that "the Jews are beginning to be affected by their conditions. Women: 
epileptic and nervous seizures. Sick children. Clogged toilets. Internees attacking police. 
Low morale. The food promised has not arrived. No water. Not enough bread. Soup is 
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served for every meal. Only two doctors. It's raining inside the track."11 Five people 
committed suicide by 20July, and seven others attempted to do the same multiple times.12
The goal of this rafle was to arrest foreign Jews in Paris, namely Germans, 
Austrians, Poles, Czechs, and Russians, as part of the Final Solution. However, there was 
another category deemed fit for arrest, as well—people considered “apatrides,” which 
Hennequin, the Director of the Municipal Police, explained as those of “indeterminable 
nationality.”13 Exceptions to arrest included pregnant mothers that policemen thought 
might deliver soon, mothers who had children still breastfeeding, children less than two 
years old, wives of prisoners of war, widows whose former spouses were not Jews, those 
married to non-Jews whose union was “not Jewish,” French Jews, Jews of nationalities 
that differed from those listed, and Jews with at least one child who was not Jewish.14
These orders came from the Reich, but the French implemented them. In fact, Vichy 
officials Pierre Laval and René Bousquet even helped plan the arrests, though the round-
up was to occur in the German-occupied zone and not the free zone.15 Given the large 
number of Jews arrested over such a short period of time, it is hard to believe that the 
police checked for all of the named exceptions. Ironically, after the war, the Vél d’hiv site 
housed collaborators awaiting trial, just like Drancy.16
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The rafle du Vél' d'Hiv was a terrible event that remains a point of shame for the 
French to this day. However, only two presidents have officially recognized French 
involvement--Chirac and Hollande. All others blamed the rafle and its aftermath on 
Vichy, "L'Etat dit français.” This is not to say that all French citizens supported these 
arrests and the internment of Jews; some citizens did speak out against it, but most did 
nothing to stop it, and a good number helped it happen. The French struggle with this 
memory today, as can be seen with their more recent choices to recall, remember, 
commemorate, and apologize constantly for such events. "The Vichy Syndrome” plagues 
France. The Vél' d'Hiv is part of a "past that does not pass," and is a trace of an 
“unachieved bereavement.”17 The long refusal to recognize French involvement in the 
Holocaust has led to a recent over-commemoration as an attempt to deal with this 
traumatic past and a guilty national conscience, like Rousso describes with his “Vichy 
Syndrome” concept.
II. The Ratonnade d’Octobre
October 17, 1961 is arguably another moment in French history yet to pass. Police 
repression of Algerians during the Algerian War marks the 1950s and early 1960s in 
Paris, especially from 1958 to 1962. In March of 1958, the French government called 
Maurice Papon to leave the fight in Algeria and return to Paris in the hopes that he might 
stop attacks on the city by the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).18 Once there, he 
assumed the position of “prefect”—chief—of the Parisian police and began drawing up 
stricter measures meant to “maintain order” in Paris at the same time the army tried to 
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“maintain order” in French Algeria.19 Thus Papon drafted a list detailing the following 
four measures he believed the government should introduce: ban suspected terrorists 
from France, “give increased powers to the military tribunals in France,” allow the police 
to detain suspicious individuals by administrative order where they lack sufficient 
evidence to bring them to court, and reintroduce the expatriation of Algerians to Algeria 
by orders issued from the court in Algiers.20 This became the Ordonnance of October 
7,1958. Under this ordinance, the police could hold Algerians “under arrest for two 
weeks,” so the police could interrogate them, and the Minister of the Interior also allowed 
them to keep Algerians in detention camps “without trial or...return them into the hands 
of the army in Algeria.”21 A little over a month before the introduction of the ordinance, 
Papon created an auxiliary police unit specifically meant to combat the FLN in Paris—
the “Service de coordination des affaires algériennes,” or simply “SCAA.”22 This unit 
commanded the already existing Brigade des agressions et violences (BAV), 8th Brigade 
territoriale, and a newly created brigade of Harkis—Algerian soldiers fighting against 
Algerian independence alongside the French.23
Around the same time as the creation of the SCAA, Papon also received approval 
for the opening of “triage (sorting) centers” in the city, which the police then used to 
detain Algerians with suspected ties to the FLN.24 The police firstly “transformed” the 
Vélodrome d’Hiver—a site of Jewish internment just sixteen years earlier—into such a 
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center six days after the approval.25 They rounded up, or “raflé” as the press called it once 
again, 3,000 Algerians for inspection and interrogation.26 The communist newspaper 
L’Humanité acknowledged and criticized the connections between Jewish internment 
during the Occupation and the internment of Algerians, stating: “A racist concentration 
camp has been open in the middle of Paris for two days. They didn’t even have the 
decency to choose a place that symbolized nothing to French patriots...Thousands of 
Algerians are imprisoned in the Vél’ d’Hiv...in which the Nazis previously crammed 
thousands of Jews!”27 The newspaper, of course, did not know at this time that the Nazis 
were not responsible, but rather that the French police had, as with the Algerians, actually 
been responsible for the collection of internees at the Vél’ d’Hiv. Like the Jews in 1942, 
the Algerian internees also endured awful conditions. The Technical Hygiene Service of 
the state performed a general inspection on September 1, 1958, finding that the site was 
overcrowded to the point that some people had to resort to sleeping while standing 
because there was no floor room, some days only one water fountain worked, there were 
no towels or toilet paper, there was hardly any way to wash oneself, piles of trash “[gave] 
off a fetid stench”, and the walls were covered in excrement.28 The police rounded up and 
interned Algerians in other places as well, including the Gymnase Japy, which was also a 
site of Jewish internment during the Occupation.29 The police stopped using the sites as 
“triage centers” in January 1959, because Parisians complained that they could not use 
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their gyms and watch live sports.30 Therefore, Papon opened a new triage center in the 
bois de Vincennes, referred to as the “Centre d’identification de Vincennes,” or “CIV”.31
Things came to a head in 1961, specifically during the months of August, 
September, and October. Journalists Marcel and Paulette Péju, who witnessed this period, 
stated that during these months, “not a day or night [went] by without frisking by the 
police, rafles, raids, and arrests...the dead and injured [were] no longer counted.”32 Police 
brutality peaked during 1961, and so did violence against the police within France; 22 
policemen and Harkis were killed, and 76 were injured.33 As a result, Papon enforced 
measures against Algerians to a greater degree. He told Le Monde on October 3, 1961, 
“for every blow received, we will render ten.”34 Two days later, he announced a curfew 
for all Algerians. They were not to be out in the city between 8:30 PM and 5:00 AM.35
Papon also recommended that Algerians walk around alone, because “small groups 
[risked] appearing suspicious to police on rounds and patrols.”36 The French branch of 
the FLN decided that Algerians should protest the curfew and called Parisian Algerians, 
including women and children, to protest peacefully on the Champs-Elysées at 8:30 PM 
on October 17, 1961.37 The FLN was clear: not a single protester should carry anything 
that even resembled a weapon.38 General Charles de Gaulle, president of the Republic, 
told Papon to ban and disperse the protest by any means, effectively giving him a “blank 
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check.”39 Papon assured his men that “they [would] be covered,” so that “when [they 
notified] headquarters that a North African [had] been shot, the boss called to the scene 
[had] what [was] needed to make sure the North African [had] a weapon on him since, at 
the...time, there [was] no room for mistakes.”40
From 6:00 PM onwards, police waited in certain “key Métro stations” and 
arrested Algerians as they stepped off the trains.41 They forced them into the connecting 
passageways between metro lines, where they detained them, waiting for transports to 
arrive, sometimes standing for three to four hours in the hot, nearly airless spaces as 
policemen beat them and insulted them.42 Papon requisitioned Régie autonome des 
transports parisiens (RATP) buses to take the rounded up Algerians to the “triage 
centers” in the city, and they often arrested Tunisians and Moroccans, as well, because 
the police arrested people who looked Algerian.43 Many protestors did not take the Métro. 
Some marched to the Pont de Neuilly from work and home, and as they reached the 
bridge, the police fired on them without warning and charged the group, wielding all sorts 
of weapons, like “riot clubs, rifle butts, and, in some instances, ‘unofficial’ weapons, 
including iron bars and pick-axe handles,” and the policemen broke thirty of the fifty 
clubs issued to them by district commander Mézière.44 Something similar occured at the 
Pont Saint Michel. The police threw the bodies of “wounded or unconscious men” into 
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the Seine.45 The following day, the prefecture issued replacement bullets to some 
officers, so that if the state opened an investigation, “they [could] give evidence that they 
had not fired.”46 Papon made sure that they were “covered” in this way as well.
One Algerian, Ahcène, shared his account of police brutality that night: “When 
the policemen [turned] to me to hit me, I [cried] out that I [was] a former solider and 
[showed] them my papers. They let me go...my friend [did] the same. They kept my 
nephew. They [continued] to beat him and blood [poured] from his head and nose. From 
afar, I [saw] them pick him up and throw him into the Seine.”47 Luckily, the nephew 
survived. Another Algerian called his six-day internment at a “triage center” 
“concentrated hell,” and during that time, the police stole his money and identification 
papers.48 A doctor at a “triage center” also gave his testimony: 
“...armed guards circulate...800 to 1,000 Algerians wait, pressed against the grates 
or sleeping close to one another on the ground to fight the cold...to the right of the 
entrance is a tent with 10 people, serving as an infirmary and hospital. To the left, 
four or five rows of tables covered in files serve as the “triage” (sorting) 
center....to take care of the injured men, we only have alcohol, liquid soap, 
oxygenated water, mercurochrome, gauze bandages, and a few surgical tools...we 
have no antibiotics...those with cranial fractures cannot be helped and die 
quickly...”49
Bodies hung in the Bois de Boulogne and littered the streets.50 Some policemen shared 
their experiences, like Raoul Letard who reported that after 11:00 PM that night, he and 
some other policemen “fired on everything that moved, it was horrible...for two hours it 
was a man hunt.”51
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In an article published just after the event, El Moudjahid wrote: “It is the French 
government that will bear the heavy responsibility of such doings.”52 The massacre, or 
“ratonnade” as it is often called, of October 17, 1961 is, like the rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv, a 
dark page in France’s history. There were actually many similarities in the way the 
French police approached both events: there were specialized intelligence agencies for 
policing of both Jews and Algerians, censuses were taken of minority populations, 
fichiers (enormous card-index files of where to find and how to identify certain 
individuals), mass round-ups, special police units just for intervening in confrontations 
with these groups, “triage centers” to detain and screen individuals, and discriminatory 
legislation meant to “identify and detain minorities.”53 Maurice Papon, the chief of the 
Parisian police, claimed “the police did what they had to do” and that they—the police, 
the French—“won the battle for Paris,” likening the police’s actions to those of Parisians 
during the Liberation in 1944 by calling it the “bataille de Paris.”54 There is no definitive 
number of deaths. However, as Jim House and Neil MacMaster state, “this does not open 
the door to relativism or the position that mass killings never occurred.”55 The police and 
historian Jean-Paul Brunet place the figure somewhere between two and fifty deaths, 
whereas historian Jean-Luc Einaudi places the figure somewhere between 200 and 350 
deaths.56 The French government has kept the archives closed, for the most part, only 
opening them to three select historians, including Brunet, but not Einaudi, even when 
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Papon was suing the historian for defamation.57 Debates over fully opening the archives, 
how to commemorate the event, and how to teach the event continue today, echoing the 
Vichy Syndrome and treatment of the rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv. The ratonnade of October 17 
remains a memory that many French want to forget and many want to constantly 
commemorate.
III. Papon on Trial
On July 16, 1995, the anniversary of the “rafle du Vélodrome d’Hiver,” Jacques 
Chirac—future president of the Republic but then mayor of Paris—publicly admitted and 
apologized for the French role in the perpetration of the round-up.58 He did not just say 
Vichy, or “L’Etat dit français,” like all those before him who commemorated the event. 
He specifically stated that French policemen carried out the act—not the Nazis nor Vichy 
police. In that same month of July 1995, Maurice Papon, secretary general of the Gironde 
police prefecture during the Occupation who later served as prefect of the Parisian police 
and Minister of the Budget under President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, stood in front of a 
judge, trying to convince him to reject the government charges brought against him by 
families of Vél’ d’Hiv victims. They meant to hold him partially responsible for the 
Vélodrome d’Hiver round-up which occurred over fifty years earlier.59 This trial played a 
substantial role in shaping how the French state and its people memorialized not only the 
rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv, but also the repression of Algerians in Paris by the police during the 
Algerian War, especially the massacre that occurred on October 17, 1961. Maurice Papon 
served as a specific police link between the two events. It is this particular trial to which 
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we now turn, beginning with its formation over the years leading up to 1995, in order to 
better understand conceptions of these events in public memory up until this point and 
after.
On December 19, 1995, the courts decided to open the trial accusing Papon of 
“crimes against humanity” for his complicity in organizing and authorizing four Jewish 
deportation convoys, or “death trains”, which the prosecution later changed to eight.60 A 
little over a year earlier, Paul Touvier became the first French citizen convicted of crimes 
against humanity for acts he committed under the Vichy regime, including the execution 
and deportation of Jews.61 Jean Leguay who, like Papon, aided in the round-up of Jews 
on the 16 and 17 July 1942, was the first Frenchman to be indicted for crimes against 
humanity in 1979, but he died of cancer ten years later without ever being convicted.62
René Bousquet, former general secretary to the Vichy police, was indicted for crimes 
against humanity two years after Leguay’s death, accused by Serge Klarsfeld as 
significantly responsible for the round-up of Jews in the “free zone,” who were later sent 
to the Vélodrome d’Hiver as part of the great round-up that took place the 16and 17 July, 
1942.63 Two years later, before Bousquet’s trial even began, Christian Didier, a man who 
tried to kill the famous S.S. officer Klaus Barbie in 1987, fatally shot Bousquet.64
One could say all of this started with “l’épuration,” the French “purge” of 
collaborators, which took place after World War II. Touvier’s and Bousquet’s trials have 
roots in this purge and both trials fell under the statute of limitations that allowed them to 
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escape conviction in one way or another until the statute was circumvented with the 
passage of a law to be discussed in the next section. President Pompidou even pardoned 
Touvier in 1971, against the recommendations of his cabinet.65 With this began the 
second purge, as groups protested against the pardon throughout 1972 and “two 
accusations of crimes against humanity [were] brought against Touvier” in 1973.66
Leguay was indicted for crimes against humanity in 1979, Touvier was indicted in 1981, 
Papon in 1983, and Bousquet in 1991.67 Throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, the 
Holocaust, Vichy, and specifically the Vélodrome d’Hiver, to which three of these four 
men were connected, were ever-present in French political culture and memory. Of these 
trials, Maurice Papon’s was the last and by far the longest. In fact, the Papon trial is the 
longest trial in at least the last century of French history, lasting 95 days and ending with 
guilty verdict for the charges of crimes against humanity and sentencing of ten years 
incarceration.68 Some say this trial became so significant because Papon stood in for 
Leguay and Bousquet, who never made it to trial.69 This further speaks to the idea of a 
“past that does not pass,” in the words of historian Henry Rousso.70
The length of Papon’s trial is certainly of consequence for broader studies of 
French memory; however its connection to two specific events—the rafle du Vélodrome 
d’Hiver, as well as the massacre of Algerians in October of 1961 and the subsequent 
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police repression of Algerians during the Algerian War—sets it apart from the other 
postwar Purge trials for the purpose of this thesis. The courts only tried and convicted 
Papon for his involvement in the round-up of July 1942, but the prosecution brought the 
October massacre out of the past to attest to Papon’s character.71 As a result, the state 
opened an official investigation into the events of October 1961. Historian Jean-Luc 
Einaudi publicly charged Papon with full responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of 
Algerians in an article he published in Le Monde 20 May, 1998, not long after the trial 
ended. Maurice Papon sued him for defamation in 1999 and despite Papon’s earlier 
conviction of crimes against humanity in the Vél’ d’Hiv case, he was officially supported 
by the French state that had recently sentenced him to imprisonment.72 The court 
dismissed the case, but in recent years the government has slowly taken steps to 
recognize and memorialize the event, primarily in the last few years, as the Algerian 
“conflict” itself was not even recognized as the “Algerian War” until the same year the 
defamation suit took place.73
Papon’s first trial raised numerous questions about responsibility for modern 
traumas and how the state should officially recognize such traumas. These issues 
reappeared in his “second” trial—his defamation suit against historian Jean-Luc Einaudi. 
Papon did not intend to become the “accused” since he was the “accuser,” but he became 
the “accused” nonetheless, as historians Jim House and Neil MacMaster state in their 
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work Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory.74 This trial was truly about the 
extent of Papon’s culpability in the mistreatment of Algerians in Paris during the 
Algerian War and, by extension, French involvement in the massacre. Again a divisive 
memory, the nation struggled with the question of how to recognize and commemorate it, 
if either at all. One decision it did make was to not make archives available but to a few 
historians not including Einaudi, as opposed to opening them completely to the public. In 
the end, the case was thrown out; as with the beginnings of commemoration and 
recognition of the Holocaust in France, the state was not yet ready to admit French 
involvement in atrocities against an “othered” population. Whatever their verdicts, both 
trials had one specific shared outcome: they made Maurice Papon a lieu de mémoire for 
the rafle and the ratonnade. As such, Papon has essentially come to represent the Vichy 
Syndrome and its modern connection to the traumas of the Algerian War that began with 
his trial. It is specifically Papon and his history that made possible the ratonnade’s 
capacity to perpetuate an obsession with Holocaust, something discussed in further detail 
in the following section on commemoration of the rafle and ratonnade.
IV. The Politics of Historical Memory: Commemorating the Rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv and the 
Ratonnade d’octobre
Though this trial of accusations between Einaudi and Papon may have set in 
motion an obsession with the Algerian War that eventually led to official recognition, it 
did little at the time and for many years following to encourage state recognition of the 
October Massacre and, more generally, police repression of Algerians in France during 
the Algerian War. This is most likely due to the fact that the French government 
associated, and still associates, this repression with the larger, still difficult topic of the 
                                                
74 House and MacMaster, Paris, 1961, 313.
53
Algerian War and state actions toward Arab populations. It was not until 1999, as noted 
earlier, that the government officially recognized the Algerian conflict as “the Algerian 
War,” previously calling it by its military moniker: “Operation Maintaining Order.”75
This issue of naming the conflict figured as a particular point of difficulty for the French 
government because in calling it the “Algerian War,” they would in effect acknowledge 
that Algeria was a separate country and not part of France, both at the time of the war’s 
actual occurrence and in contemporary times. Algeria was not a typical colony; in fact, it 
was not officially a colony, possession, or territory at all. It was “departmentalized” into 
three departments—essentially administrative states—of France, therefore existing much 
like the regular departments in “l’Hexagone.”76 Therefore, to the French state, Algeria 
was actually a true part of France, which explains its longtime reluctance to call the 
conflict the “Algerian” War. Arguing about semantics in this case was actually quite 
important. This particular piece of legislation demonstrated that the French government 
was only just beginning to come to terms with the meaning of the large issue that is the 
Algerian War. Changing the name of the conflict was a first step toward a new memory, 
but France was perhaps not yet ready to fully examine all aspects of that time period. 
However, on October 16, 1997, the government did promise to open the archives 
specifically concerning police repression of Algerians in France during the Algerian War, 
previously sealed to the public by governmental legislation.77 It was not until 1998 that 
the state “opened” the archives—to “three hand-picked historians.”78 To this day, the 
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government has yet to fully open the archives, which reveals continuing controversy and 
difficulties surrounding this particular event.
Refusing to open the official archives does not, of course, mean that there is not 
or there has not been collective commemoration of the police repression of Algerians and 
specifically the ratonnade d’octobre. Memorialization began to develop throughout the 
1980s, becoming larger in scale and more frequent in the 1990s. Michel Levine published 
the first historical work on the subject in 1985 under the title Ratonnades d’octobre, to 
which there was little response.79 In 1990, the organization “Au nom de la mémoire”—
“In Memory’s Name”—placed a plaque under the bridge located in the Parisian suburb of 
Bezons to commemorate victims of the October massacre, which the police prefecture 
promptly removed.80 One year later on the 17October, 10,000 protestors walked the same 
path many Algerians took that same night thirty years before, carrying banners that read 
“No to racism, no to forgetting. For the right to memory.”81 Ten years later and two years 
after the official recognition of the “Algerian War,” the Paris City Council finally 
decided, by a close vote, to place a plaque on the Right Bank side of the Pont Saint 
Michel.82 Its inscription reads: “In memory of the many Algerians killed during the 
bloody repression of the peaceful demonstration of October 17, 1961.” Such wording left 
ambiguous the perpetrator of this “bloody repression,” again showing reluctance to admit 
French involvement in the execution of the massacre, just as with the rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv. 
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In addition, “no government member attended [the placement of the plaque] in an official 
capacity.”83
This is the plaque placed by the Paris City Council. It is hardly noticeable when walking around
this area. (Photo my own, June 2013)
In the years since the placement of the plaque, commemoration has become much 
more active and frequent. One particularly significant development in the 
commemoration of the October Massacre occurred in 2012 when President François 
Hollande officially recognized the massacre and French perpetration of the event. He 
signed the “Call for the official recognition of the tragedy of the 17 October 1961 in 
Paris,” and spoke at the commemorative anniversary of the event.84 Although he did not 
officially lay the blame on the Republic during his speech, his signature of the unofficial 
decree (unofficial in the sense that it was not an actual piece of legislation and not drafted 
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by the President himself) and his spoken recognition that the event simply happened was 
enough for critics and activists alike to call it an official recognition.85 It was a large 
gesture that carried both political and historical weight, comparable to Jacques Chirac’s 
recognition in 1995 of French involvement in the rafle du Vél d’Hiv.
Unlike the police repression of Algerians during the late 1950s and 1960s and 
specifically the October Massacre, which, up until the last few years, the French 
population hardly commemorated, the round-up at the Vélodrome d’Hiver has 
experienced what some might call “over-commemoration.” By at least 1960, some 
French citizens began to collectively and publicly memorialize the event. Le Monde
described the 1942 round-up and announced the details of the ceremony that would take 
place on July 12, 1960.86 This “over-commemoration” did not begin in 1960, but 
developed throughout the 1970s and 1980s, eventually reaching peak recollection and 
memorialization in the 1990s. Each decade marked a new phase of French 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung—“the process of coming to terms with the past”—
specifically their Vichy past, just like Germany’s attempts at dealing with its Nazi past 
for which this term was created to describe.  
Though commemoration may have started much earlier for the rafle du Vél’ 
d’Hiv than for the police repression of Algerians in France, the French had yet to come to 
terms with their own involvement in the execution of the event. One can see this with Le 
Monde’s brief summary of the round-up in the previously described article from 1960, 
which states that the Gestapo, not the French police, arrested Jews in Paris those two days 
in July. Though some might argue that many French citizens did not know, many did, and 
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to argue that the French had no knowledge of this fact is wrong; the round-up happened 
in Parisian streets, in broad daylight, at the hands of French policemen, many of whom 
were still alive to remember these events in 1960. Not only did many French surely know 
about the involvement of their fellow citizens in rounding up the Jews, they also knew 
that those arrested were not simply sent to work camps. As historian Robert Paxton said 
in an interview: “...when they deported old people and children, they obviously knew that 
they were not being sent to work camps. Their exact fate was not known, but the fact that 
they would be mistreated could not be ignored and they knew this treatment would be 
inhumane.”87
The government did actively censor the media and the arts during the 1950s and 
60s, however, specifically in regards to representations of French collaboration. Just five 
years prior to the publication of the Le Monde article, the Republic censored Alain 
Resnais’s controversial film Nuit et brouillard. They threatened to ban its release unless 
the director agreed to make a French policeman unidentifiable as French in one scene that 
showed this policeman looking out over a Vichy internment camp.88 So in some ways 
one can understand how at least those born after the rafle might not have known the 
extent of French involvement. Specifically government censorship, though, speaks to the 
reluctance at that time of the state and its officials—the great majority of whom were 
alive and held public service positions during the war—to recognize any culpability on 
the side of the “true” French, that is to say all French citizens under the Fourth Republic. 
Ironically, in acting on this reluctance, the state repressed civil liberties, for which 
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Vichy—the same government against which the postwar Republic tried to define itself—
was notorious.
As the years passed, groups of citizens continued to commemorate the rafle. 
Before the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, very few French citizens ever called for 
official state recognition of French perpetration of the rafle. One can attribute much of 
the change in sentiment after the 1980s to the evolving spirit of the times largely created 
and dictated by the series of trials previously discussed. On February 3, 1993, for 
example, the government proclaimed July 16 as a “national day of commemoration for 
the racist and anti-Semitic acts of persecution committed under the authority of the de 
facto ‘government of the French State’ (1940-1944).”89 The next year on July 17, 1994, 
François Mitterrand, then president of the Republic, inaugurated a monument in homage 
to victims of the rafle. The sculpture’s inscription reads: “The French Republic pays 
homage to the victims of racist and anti-Semitic persecution and crimes against 
humanity, committed under the authority of the de facto ‘government of the French State’ 
(1940-1944). Never forget.”90 Both the decree and the monument’s inscription reveal 
France’s difficulty to officially admit its own role in the Final Solution. The French 
displaced the blame by firstly naming Vichy as solely responsible, and secondly by 
separating the Vichy government from the true “Republic.” The use of quotation marks 
around the proclaimed name of the French government under Vichy shows the refusal of 
French officials in the 1990s to recognize Vichy as a valid government and, furthermore, 
as representative of the French. They were right to believe that much of what Vichy stood 
for went against the core principles of the French Republic. However, to them, the real 
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French Republic did not exist at all during the four-year period of 1940 to 1944, and 
therefore could not be blamed for “acts of persecution” committed both in the occupied 
and unoccupied zones.
The Vél’ d’Hiv monument inaugurated by François Mitterrand. (Photo my own, June 2013)
Mitterrand stated in 1992 during the Fête nationale that French citizens should not 
hold the Republic accountable for any persecution or crimes committed against Jews.91
He said with little sensitivity that the Republic “did what it [or she] had to do,” thus 
attempting to explain French collaboration at the same time he was trying to say that it 
was not really the French who collaborated.92 Speaking about collaboration on the day of 
the Fête nationale shows a troubled government increasingly conscious of past crimes, 
leading to a near-constant, unapologetically nationalistic, defensive rhetoric. Normally, a 
president would not address any sort of negative perception of the Republic on the 
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national holiday. It seemed that the president and other officials felt that if they admitted 
any sort of involvement in the rafle, and by extension the Holocaust, it would mean the 
end of the true Republic or, more specifically, its core principles that they viewed as the 
basis for all laws and official actions of the state. In 1994 after the inauguration of the 
monument, Mitterrand strongly reaffirmed his ideas about the rafle: “I will not make 
excuses in the name of France...France is not responsible...Not the Republic, not 
France!”93 Perhaps this also reflected Mitterrand’s personal conflicts with the Vichy 
period, during which he served as an official of the Vichy regime for a time and as a 
member of the Resistance for a time.
Beginning in the late 1980s, many organizations, like the Comité du Vél’ d’Hiv 
42 and the Amicale des anciens déportés juifs de France, actively encouraged Mitterrand 
and the French State to recognize French involvement.94 However, it was not until 1995 
that Jacques Chirac, not President Mitterrand, publicly admitted French involvement in 
the rafle. On the 16 July, 1995, Chirac gave the annual commemorative speech. Le 
Monde reported that after giving a “brief introduction,” he “exclaimed” that “the 
occupier’s criminal insanity was seconded by the French, by the French State”—not the 
“de facto ‘government of the French State.’”95 He further detailed French involvement, 
going on to explain just how far it went, recognizing that “Parisian buses and police 
vans” deported the Jews who were rounded up.96 He noted with incredulity that such an 
event happened at the hands of citizens of the country known for the Enlightenment and 
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the “droits de l’homme”—“the Rights of Man.”97 He told the audience that, “on that day, 
France committed an irreparable [atrocity].”98 Prime Minister Lionel Jospin publicly 
disagreed with Chirac, stating that “Vichy was the negation of France,” and therefore one 
could never say the people who and the government that committed these acts were truly 
French, of course refusing to recognize that Frenchmen of the occupied zone—not Vichy 
(though they did play a role in getting Jews within Vichy territory to Paris for this 
event)—arrested the Jews in Paris during the rafle.99 The argument devolved into a fight 
over semantics, just as it did for the government in regards to the Algerian War, because 
there was little else officials like Jospin and Mitterrand could use to remove blame from 
the Republic. They had to create a non-French entity on which to lay the blame and so 
they defined Vichy as non-French.
Five years later at an international conference about the Holocaust in Stockholm, 
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin finally admitted, however vaguely, that France was 
responsible for the Vél’ d’Hiv round-up. At this conference dedicated purely to how 
European governments should deal with their Holocaust past—something unique to this 
singular event and practically nonexistent for all other traumatic European events—
Jospin spoke of the importance of teaching about the Holocaust. He pointed to France as 
an example, stating “In France, we now fully prescribe to this devoir de mémoire et 
d’éducation [duty to remember and teach].”100 This idea of a “devoir de mémoire,” or 
duty of memory/to remember, is why France has what Henry Rousso calls the “Vichy 
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Syndrome”—this obsession with the past and the feeling that French citizens and the 
French government constantly have to recall this period of history. This is certainly true; 
the government often does affirm that the French have a “devoir de mémoire,” as one can 
see with Lionel Jospin’s statement that schools should put an emphasis on teaching 
students about the Holocaust; but the complete historical truth of the French role in 
facilitating the Holocaust has always been difficult to acknowledge. 
Schools, in particular, have nevertheless taken up this memorializing task for
quite some time now; Eric Conan and Henry Rousso reported in 1994 that French 
historical textbooks for public school students dedicated up to fifteen percent of their 
material to just four years of the nation’s history: 1940 to 1944.101 In addition, a large
number of Parisian primary schools placed plaques about the deportation of Jews at the 
entrances of their institutions. This lies in stark contrast with treatment of the Algerian 
War, and more specifically the October massacre, in schools. Historian and Inspector 
General of National Education from 1991 to 2003, Jean-Pierre Rioux, stated in 2001 that 
“he was not sure if teachers should talk about [the events of 17October] to students 
because it could incite the formation of a poor opinion of the police and other institutions 
of the Republic.”102
Another more focused example of the expanding historical memory of the rafle du 
Vél’ d’Hiv can be found among the Parisian police, as well. The 2005 Parisian Chief of 
Police, Pierre Mutz, told The Guardian that “all new Paris recruits would visit the 
[Holocaust] Memorial centre and archives as a part of their training.”103 Such a measure 
shows just how important contemporary governmental organizations now believe the 
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memory of this period should be. They want people to recall this specific period, 
certainly in the hopes that something like the rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv will never happen again, 
but also perhaps for the government to convince itself and its citizens that they are 
dealing with their dark past in a way that leaves no room for criticism.
This is the “over-commemoration” symptomatic of the “Vichy syndrome” about 
which Conan and Rousso write. Since the government has taken up such a “duty”—a 
duty to “[reaffirm] universal, humanist values” through “recognition of debt”—individual 
citizens are also taught to feel the same way, to feel like, as one French woman put it 
recently, “we will never be able to do enough.”104 The Vichy Syndrome has yet to come 
to an end, as many might argue it did with the conclusion of the Papon trial. The Vichy 
syndrome has become a kind of hyper-consciousness about events between 1940 and 
1944 and, more specifically, the rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv of 1942, which has come to be the 
site-specific representation of France’s role in the Holocaust. The foundation that 
organized the commemoration of the Camp des Milles, for example, called les Milles the 
“Vél’ d’Hiv of the south;” and when the French state referred to this round-up when it 
wanted to inaugurate the Drancy museum on the event’s July anniversary. Meanwhile, 
the October massacre has in similar ways come to represent the wider history of police 
repression of Algerians in France during the Algerian War;105 in both cases, the past 
remains part of the French present, because the government has gradually come to define 
and disseminate historical memory, creating an “official” history or “official” memory. 
Such an approach to history proves problematic as it usually does not allow for a 
diversity of voices and thus creates a “right” type or perception of history and certain 
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historical events. In the French language, history, in the broadest sense as an entire 
discipline and unique entity, is spelled with a capitalized “H”—“l’Histoire”—giving it 
pronoun-like properties, that is to say agency. To historians like Pierre Nora, such a 
distinction confirms his belief in allowing history to speak for itself through historical 
research by scholars, not to be written, dictated, or judged by the government.106 It was 
the Papon trial, during which the judicial system all but demanded that historians like 
Robert Paxton and Jean-Luc Einaudi should provide an “official” history with which 
prosecutors could prove Papon guilty, that led Nora to this claim and to take part in the 
“Liberté pour l’Histoire” movement.
Where Nora, Rousso, and Conan take a more critical, largely negative, approach 
to this “devoir de mémoire,” believing that the time has passed for legal prosecutions 
beyond the statute of limitations, the historian and famed Nazi-hunter Serge Klarsfeld 
takes the opposite approach, stating, “I believe we must ceaselessly remember that which 
I call the darkest page of French history.”107 Nora and Rousso find problematic this new 
French approach to the ethics of justice in regards to cases that have passed the statute of 
limitations. As a result, Nora and many other historians created a movement called 
“Liberté pour l’Histoire”—“Freedom for History”—in order to address the 
nationalization of history, for lack of better terms. Much as some call for a France for the 
“French,” these historians believe history lies within the realm of historians. They state:
“France is the only democratic country to have imposed upon its citizens such a 
body of ‘historical’ legislation...On the 12th of October, 2006, a deputy declared to 
the tribunal: ‘We don’t leave medicine to doctors, why should we leave history to 
historians?’...But we have never seen the Parliament substitute its own diagnosis 
and prescriptions for those of doctors...In regards to the Past, what are 
parliamentarians currently doing? They are substituting their diagnoses for those 
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of historians. In doing so, they are placing researchers under the tutelage of 
judges.”108
It is true—the government should not write history because this creates an “official” 
history. Government histories usually reject the idea that history has a multitude of voices 
and perspectives, and that historical knowledge often has subjective elements. Nora 
touches on this when he expresses concern about the “victimization of the past,” meaning 
a view and judgment of the past solely from the victim’s perspective. France particularly 
struggles in this respect because of the previously discussed paradox of desiring unity, 
thus favoring an official history, and upholding its commitment to the preservation of 
human rights, thus wanting to acknowledge human rights violations. The state imagines 
that fully recognizing French involvement would divide the nation. Many officials like 
Jospin and Mitterrand thought such division might occur if they admitted to fault on 
behalf of the Republic in regards to the rafle, though it ultimately did not. In attempt to 
satisfy both paradoxical desires of the nation, officials tried and continue to try to 
selectively remember and judge parts of events related to the Holocaust and the Algerian 
War. In addition, as Eric Conan and Henry Rousso stated, this “obsession with the past—
with this specific [Holocaust] past—is only a substitute for the pressing matters of the 
present or, worse still, a refusal of the future.”109 Thus remembrance of one event can be 
perpetuated by a refusal to confront other controversial events.
The Gayssot Act, in particular, demonstrates this situation of denying and 
circumventing official remembrance of one trauma through recognition of another. The 
Gayssot Act served as a way to avoid the trauma of Algeria by addressing the memory of 
the Holocaust. France did not ratify the United Nations’ “Convention on the non-
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applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity,” drafted 
in 1968, shortly after the Algerian War.110 Instead, France selectively chose to create its 
own law—la loi Gayssot—in 1990 to circumvent the statute of limitations just for any 
crimes against humanity related to the Holocaust. One key reason behind adopting the 
Gayssot Act in lieu of signing the United Nations’ convention was to keep French 
military officials from facing indictment for crimes against humanity for the use of 
torture on Algerians during the Algerian War.  In trying to “[reaffirm] universal, 
humanist values,” the French negated them by selectively recognizing instances of crimes 
against humanity rather than recognizing all such instances. This reveals a problem that 
the Vichy Syndrome can create: the state can use this obsession to avoid confronting 
other controversial events. Dominick LaCapra notes the power of the Holocaust memory 
in this way, stating that “the challenge is to discuss [the Holocaust] in ways that [do not] 
allow it to serve diversionary functions.”111
An obsession with the Algerian War has begun to develop over the past two decades 
through attempts to deny aspects of it and to use other aspects to support Holocaust 
remembrance. This again reveals a guilty conscience, as with the Holocaust memory in 
France, fed by a failure to acknowledge the complete historical truth of French 
involvement in the persecution of Algerians. As LaCapra states, “the French concern with 
Vichy is a way of displacing anxiety about Algeria and its aftermath.”112 It is a complex 
situation because the Vichy Syndrome simultaneously leads to the purposeful denial of 
one trauma and in doing such increases focus on the same trauma. This is especially true 
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for these two particular events, the rafle and ratonnade, because of their historical 
similarities and their shared lieu de mémoire—Maurice Papon; their connection 
inevitably causes them to affect one another’s remembrance and the Vichy Syndrome 
complicates the commemoration of both.
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Camp Joffre de Rivesaltes and the “Victims” of the Vichy Syndrome
Camp Joffre de Rivesaltes, located a few hours north of the Spanish-French 
border between the Pyrenees Mountains and the Mediterranean Sea, has a long history of 
housing, imprisoning, and interning many different groups of people of various 
nationalities. Despite this fact, the Camp de Rivesaltes is often solely associated with 
Jewish internment and deportation, which took place during two years of the camp’s 72-
year existence. Algerians, including those called “Harkis” who served in the French 
military during the Algerian War, lived in the camp for the longest period of time. Many 
refer to them as the oubliés, or “forgotten,” of history, though it is questionable if they are 
really forgotten or if the French repress memories of them.1 Some of the interned call 
themselves the “victims” of a “particular history.”2 This chapter analyzes the history of 
the camp, divided into three chronological sections, and how the space has been 
collectively memorialized, specifically examining how its connection to the Holocaust 
has affected public perceptions of the camp. In looking at the three phases of the camp’s 
history, this chapter demonstrates the greater problems the Vichy Syndrome poses for 
memories of non-Holocaust modern traumas in France’s past.
I. Rivesaltes Before Jewish Internment: 1935-1940
In 1935, a new military camp opened in Rivesaltes named “Camp Joffre,” after 
Maréchal Joffre, a native of Rivesaltes and a hero of the Great War.3 Given its location 
near the Mediterranean Sea, the camp was ideal for the training of North African colonial 
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troops; this was the camp’s original purpose. Beginning in 1939, the French created 
companies of foreign workers (CTE), later called groups of foreign workers (GTE) like 
those from the Camp des Milles, to do construction work on the site and to build new, 
extended areas of the camp. These companies or groups consisted mainly of Spanish 
immigrants who had fled Franco’s dictatorial regime. Until 1940, these workers 
continued to expand the camp. The French military envisioned an enormous facility that 
would consist of 2400 barracks grouped into 16 sectors, able to house approximately 
18,000 soldiers. It never attained this size, but it eventually reached a total of 9 sectors.4
This image shows the current state of much of the camp. In the center is an intact latrine and 
around it are dilapidated barracks and overgrown vegetation. In the background, one can see the 
Pyrenees. (Photo my own, June 2013)
In 1939, the colonial troops left the camp for the front. After their defeat, they 
returned to Camp Joffre to await direction. Following the armistice between France and 
Germany, the troops were gradually sent back to their countries of origin. The last group 
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of over 4000 colonial soldiers did not leave the camp until January 1941.5 Despite the 
continued presence of troops in the camp’s barracks through 1940, the camp ceased 
operation as a military site that year. The new Vichy regime officially reopened the Camp 
de Rivesaltes as a site of internment on 10 August 1940, calling it the “Rivesaltes 
Accommodation Facility.”6 The site already housed some Spanish immigrants who 
worked on the camp, as well as some internees left over from the French Republic, 
mostly Jewish immigrants from Axis countries, who resembled the internees at the Camp 
des Milles. These individuals continued to stay in the camp after the change in power to 
the Vichy regime.
A few months later, the government renamed the camp—the “Accommodation 
and Political Asylum Facility.” At this point, the site housed 2000 internees, roughly 
made up of 1000 Spanish and 1000 Jewish immigrants, but the numbers grew each day, 
especially with the rise of new legislation against “undesirables.”7 This marked the 
beginning of both Jewish and Gypsy internment in unoccupied France. Spanish exiles, 
the most numerous group at Rivesaltes until 1940, continued to be interned there as well, 
though the French authorities and Spanish priests supporting Franco constantly tried to 
convince them to return to Spain and to live under the dictatorship they fled.
II. Rivesaltes During Jewish Internment: 1940-1942
These three groups at the camp—Spanish immigrants, Jews, and Gypsies—were 
all treated very differently from each other starting in 1940. The Spanish continued to 
work in the GTE and they were also given the job of working in the kitchens—a coveted 
position given the access to food, which was strictly rationed. Jewish internees found 





themselves subject to the most security. They were restricted to Sectors F and K, isolated 
from the rest of the camp and banned from contact with the other internees; essentially, 
they were ghettoized within the camp. As the numbers of Jewish internees increased 
every day, the camp authorities further increased their separation from others through 
greater security measures. One internee, Elsa Ruth, stated in August 1942: “Things are 
not going well here, all of Sector K was emptied and they put barbed wire around Sectors 
F and K.”8 Gypsies were also treated differently from the other two groups. They were 
the only male internees allowed to live in the same barracks as their families. The French 
separated Spanish men from the women and children, and they did the same with the 
Jewish internees. Of the three groups at the camp, Jews received the worst treatment and, 
of course, they would have a very different fate than the other prisoners.
There were some things all internees experienced in the camp: a lack of proper 
hygiene, pests and vermin, malnutrition, and extreme weather conditions. Temperature in 
the area often ranged twenty degrees Celsius—approximately 45 degrees Fahrenheit—in 
a single day. The summers were extremely hot and dry. Rivesaltes also experienced one 
of its coldest winters in 1942. In addition, the tramontane—a strong, dry cold wind that 
comes from the north—blew 100 days in the year, sometimes up to 120 kilometers per 
hour, or 75 miles per hour.9 Internees struggled daily against extreme weather conditions. 
Jews in Sector K found their situation particularly miserable, as they had no heat until 
one month before the liquidation of that area of the camp.10 The blankets all internees 
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used were “recycled” blankets that camp authorities previously used to bury the dead. 
Since many deaths occurred as a result of disease, these blankets very well may have 
infected the living who received these blankets afterwards.11 From February to July 1941, 
the morbidity rate among all internees at the Camp de Rivesaltes was nearly 40 percent.12
Malnutrition and a lack of food contributed greatly to the high rate of disease 
among the interned. There were three meals a day. For breakfast, each adult received a 
“café mora”—rye coffee.13 For lunch and dinner, internees received a piece of 
headcheese, some vegetables, a little bit of bread, and barley coffee.14 As a result of this 
meager diet, the prisoners’ “principal preoccupation” was food.15 Many younger 
internees went throughout the camp all day searching for food like “savage, starving 
dogs.”16 Some, especially children, developed cachexia—a condition where individuals 
lose the will to live and do not eat as a result of severe malnutrition. Not only was the 
food insufficient, the camp’s water was polluted, which led to a great number of 
gastrointestinal infections, such as dysentery.17 Measles and Chickenpox were also 
common during this period, given the large population of children. In September 1941, a 
typhoid epidemic broke out. To make matters worse, the camp infirmary had very little 
medicine with which to treat the ill and only 300 sick beds for thousands of internees.18
                                                
11 Ibid.
12 Peschanski, 142.
13 Santiago Salgado, interview from 28 December 2006, in Violette Marcos and Juanito Marcos’ 
Les Camps de Rivesaltes: une histoire de l’enfermement (1935-2007) (Portet-sur-Garonne, 
France: Nouvelles Editions Loubatières, 2009), 53-54.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 60.
16 Antonio Cascarosa, interview from 13 October 2006, in ibid., 57.
17 Peschanski, La France des camps, 142.
18 Marcos & Marcos, Les Camps de Rivesaltes, 51.
73
In addition to extreme weather conditions and a lack of food, unsanitary 
conditions also caused disease in the camp. Rats and vermin infested Camp de Rivesaltes, 
carrying disease, infecting internees, and polluting the water in the camp. The toilets were 
located directly beside the two well-water sources, which ultimately led to contamination. 
Internees had difficulty keeping themselves clean, partly as a result of the polluted water, 
and partly because they showered only once a month—sometimes not even once. During 
these rare moments, they each shared a shower with twenty to thirty other people, and 
each group had ten minutes altogether to shower before the next group of twenty to thirty 
arrived.19 Showers also meant little more than quickly rinsing off because soap was 
rationed. One internee remembers when the camp authorities provided the tiniest piece of 
soap for 100 people, an absurd situation in which the internees responded with laughter.20
Each night, they slept on beds infested with lice, fleas, and other insects. Each day, they 
wore the same set of clothes, which they cleaned with the polluted water, and many had 
no shoes.21 Camp officials often took the few belongings internees brought with them 
upon arrival, but the prisoners seldom got them back and never received compensation 
for their losses.22
A considerable percentage of the internees were children. In April 1941, children 
numbered 2000 out of Camp Joffre’s total population of 8000.23 To accommodate the 
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growing number of births, camp officials allowed women in the late stages of pregnancy 
to go to the château “mas Mirous,” which both camp authorities and the internees called 
the “Elne Maternity Ward.”24 Some very ill young children were also sent to the château 
to improve their condition. The French humanitarian “Organization for aiding children” 
(OSE) created and staffed this house as an unofficial, off-site part of the camp, but most 
of those taken there were not allowed to stay for more than a few weeks, though a few 
stayed for months. At the actual camp, humanitarian organizations including the OSE, 
another French agency set up to support refugees in France (CIMADE), the American 
Unitarian Service Committee (USC), and the Swiss Red Cross took care of the interned 
children.25 Most of these organizations were based in Sector K, one of the two Jewish 
sectors. They tried most of all to provide more food for the internees—especially milk—
but they also worked to provide them with clothes, books, and items with which to play 
games or sports.26 The famous Swiss Red Cross nurse Friedel Bohny-Reiter, who worked 
at Rivesaltes from 1941 to 1942, later published a journal that described the terrible 
conditions that children (especially Jewish children) endured during this period.
The Vichy government decided to get involved with the care of the camp’s 
children in May 1941 when it opened a school on the site. Over 1500 children between 
the ages of six and fourteen attended this school, which was divided into 38 forty-student 
classes.27 The number of students dropped to less than 250 within a year, however, as 
students stopped attending; school was not obligatory, and therefore attendance was not 
enforced. The buildings in which the camp held classes had no heat, there were precious 
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few materials with which to teach, and, as one internee said, they “did not learn 
anything.”28 All of these factors quickly contributed to a widespread apathy towards 
school.
Cultural and social life was not particularly rich at the camp. In contrast to the 
Camp des Milles, the Camp de Rivesaltes was not filled with artists and intellectuals at 
any point. The establishment of the Vichy regime brought worse conditions to les Milles, 
leading to a lack of cultural events there, and this period at the Camp de Rivesaltes also 
became particularly bleak in regards to social and cultural life. Jewish internees could 
only gather in the foyer of Sector K to socialize, as well as in two foyers in Sector J—one 
intended for putting on and viewing theatrical productions, and the other for children. 
Non-Jewish internees could also gather in the foyers of Sectors B and J to produce and 
view plays or performances. Humanitarian organizations arranged events in these spaces 
in an attempt to better the lives of the camp’s inhabitants. The YMCA also set up a 
library with works in several different languages, trying to give internees an escape from 
the serious concerns that plagued their lives at the Camp de Rivesaltes. Occasionally 
camp officials organized benefit concerts in conjunction with humanitarian organizations 
or the state, where the internees would perform.29 It seems terribly ironic that these 
internees had to play at such events to raise money for the same government that 
imprisoned and mistreated them.
The camp changed its functions for the Jewish population in August 1942, when it 
no longer served as a transit and internment camp, but rather as a deportation camp after 
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the Vichy government signed the Bousquet-Knochen agreement.30 Nine convoys left 
Rivesaltes for Drancy between August and October 1942, and the Rivesaltes deportees 
were sent from Drancy to Auschwitz. There were 2,313 Jewish men, women, and 
children at Camp Joffre who boarded train cars intended for animals. In each car, officials 
threw in a handful of hay and one bowl or two in which the deportees could relieve 
themselves, and the travel conditions for the Joffre internees were as bad as the 
conditions for those deported from the Camp des Milles.31 Some of those deported from 
Rivesaltes had been interned earlier at the Camp des Milles, but some internees were able 
to escape deportation.32 In fact, the Camp de Rivesaltes had a very high number of 
escapees compared to other camps, and in 1942 alone more than 850 people escaped.33
Those who escaped were lucky, because none of the 2,313 deported Jews would survive 
Drancy or Auschwitz.34 Others attempted suicide or were seriously injured as they tried 
to jump off the trains.
III. Rivesaltes After Jewish Internment: 1942-2007
By 24 November 1942, the Rivesaltes camp was empty. Camp officials sent the 
remaining prisoners to other camps in the unoccupied zone or relocated them nearby to 
continue work with the GTE.35 Less than a week later, German “intervention” troops took 
over the camp to use it as a military barracks. Camp Joffre served a particular purpose for 
these troops in allowing them to keep an eye on the Mediterranean. The Germans stayed 
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until 19 August 1944, when they left in haste and destroyed many of the camp’s 
structures on their way out.36 One month later, the camp changed hands again as Vichy 
leaders fled the country. French Resistants, specifically Maquisards, soon reopened the 
camp as a “Surveillance Center” with the help of the new Minister of the Interior in the 
Pyrénées-Orientales department—within which the camp was located. In a striking 
reversal of political and military positions, Rivesaltes was now used to house captured 
German soldiers, members of the infamous Vichy “Milice,” the “Légion des volontaires 
français” (Frenchmen who voluntarily fought on the Eastern Front for the Nazis during 
the war), and other collaborators, including some members of the pro-Vichy press.37
Many of the new French internees were later moved to other camps, but some stayed at 
Rivesaltes to await trial during the “Purge” that took place between 1944 and 1951. Nazi 
soldiers, treated as prisoners of war, lived in particularly deplorable conditions at Camp 
Joffre, where they suffered from high rates of disease and mortality. This Surveillance
Camp closed in 1948 before the Purge ended.
In December 1951 the camp reopened as a military installment called the 
“Rivesaltes Center for Accelerated Technical Military Training.” The French government 
created this program to train selected voluntary conscripts from Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. The goal was to assimilate these “French Muslims,” as the government 
collectively called them, by teaching them military basics and other skills that would lead 
to a profession. The conscripts were also required to study French, and to receive a 
French civic education.38 Camp Joffre continued to function in this way until 1969, but 





starting in 1957 the camp also became a mobilization point for the regular French troops 
that departed for Algeria up until 1962.39
The end of the Algerian War brought new changes to the camp. It ceased to 
operate as an active base for troop deployment and again became a place of internment, 
even though “internment” was not part of the camp’s name. In February 1962, the French 
government turned one area of the camp into a prison for those who supported the Front 
de Libération Nationale (FLN)— the key group involved that was leading the fight for 
Algerian independence. A mere one month later, after signing the Evian Accords that 
recognized Algerian independence and “ended” the war, the government began to release 
the FLN prisoners.40 With these Accords came an exodus of Pieds-noirs (individuals with 
French origins who settled in Algeria) and Harkis (ethnic Algerians who served in the 
French army or government) out of Algeria into France, and the Harkis found themselves 
in a particularly difficult situation: Algeria was no longer part of France and therefore the 
Harkis no longer had the protection of the French government, French citizenship, or 
French-funded jobs. In addition, Algerian nationalists did not view the Harkis as true 
Algerians, and they were condemned as traitors, oppressors, and collaborators. They 
therefore suffered at the hands of Algerian citizens who even went so far as to massacre 
groups of them at a time following the Evian Accords. Thus many Harkis fled or 
attempted to flee the country for France, hoping to find refuge there. The French 
government, despite knowing the situation Harkis faced in Algeria, tried to restrict their 
immigration by introducing legislation that only allowed in a “limited number” of those 




deemed “particularly threatened.”41 Many nevertheless reached France with their families 
as illegal immigrants, scared of being killed, or punished like so many of their 
compatriots in Algeria. Sadly, many of those who made it to France were killed by 
hostile French citizens upon their arrival at the ports at Marseille and Toulon, or they 
were immediately sent back to Algeria.42
A large number of Harkis eventually moved into France despite the violence and 
despite the attempts of the French government to keep them out of the country. Officials 
then faced the challenge of accommodating all of these immigrants. The government 
could no longer avoid assuming responsibility for the Harkis who were on French soil; 
and the French public would increasingly disapprove of the official indifference to the 
Harkis, especially since they were military veterans. As a result, the government housed 
them in camps like Rivesaltes. For a while, they did not live in any of the buildings at 
Camp Joffre; they lived in tents because of the dilapidated state of the former barracks. 
Thousands of Harkis and their families spent the cold, windy winter of 1962 in khaki 
military tents on the barren, arid land where the camp was located.43 They later moved 
into four of the site’s sectors, including one that had housed Jews during World War II. 
Two families, who often did not know each other prior to their arrival at the camp, lived 
together in each individual barracks. The camp officials tried to make “villages” out of 
the sectors, and as part of this plan, members of each “village” were not allowed to 
communicate with others outside of their own “village.” Many of the internees were 
                                                
41 Hamoumou and Moumen, “L’histoire des harkis,” in Stora and Harbi’s La Guerre d’Algérie, 
332.
42 Ibid.
43Le Monde, 8 October 1962.
80
confused by this ban on communications; as one stated: “we had no idea what the actual 
rules were, it was like that—laws that weren’t written but that everyone respected.”44
The Harkis at the camp were not classified as prisoners, but they were more or 
less treated as such. They were subjected to various rules that limited their freedoms, 
including restrictions on their communications with other camp residents. Another 
particular way in which they saw themselves as essentially prisoners of the French 
government was their inability to leave the site without special passes, which were 
extremely hard to come by. One Harki detailed his encounter with a guard at the border 
of the camp: “We arrived at Rivesaltes at 4 AM and two hours later, after getting dressed, 
I decided to go into the village to buy a newspaper. A soldier intercepted me and asked, 
‘Do you have a pass?’ [I responded,] ‘Why? Am I a prisoner?’ ‘No, sir, but you need a 
pass to leave the camp.’”45 It seemed odd to many that those who served in the French 
military and who came to France for refuge now found themselves interned by the French 
government. Years later, one female internee said that she was convinced that the French 
were trying to “hide” them from the French public.46 Those interned certainly lived in a 
sort of ghetto—purposefully kept away from the rest of France’s population, subjected to 
a different set of rules, and confined within lower living standards.
During their internment at Rivesaltes, Harkis did not live in conditions as 
miserable as those that the previously interned Spaniards, Jews, and Gypsies experienced 
during their time at the camp, but they lived there much longer. The French military 
generally took decent physical care of the internees, providing them with ample food, 
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clean water, and access to satisfactory healthcare. The greatest problems Harkis and their 
families reported were the extreme weather conditions and the filthy state of their beds, 
but above all they constantly feared they would be sent back to Algeria.47 The French 
officials provided internees with clothes soon after their arrival at Rivesaltes. This 
particular detail posed many problems for the Harkis because many of them—the 
majority, in fact—arrived at the camp in their uniforms. A good number of the Harkis 
believed that during their time in France they would finish their service time in the 
French military. They did not realize, however, that the French government did not intend 
to keep them in the military; in fact, the government wanted the Harkis to become 
“civilians” as soon as possible.48
One could speculate about the many reasons why the French government and 
French military wanted this—to cut costs, to absolve the military of responsibility for the 
Harkis, to attempt to assimilate the “French Muslims” whose traditional garb and soon-
to-be-retired military uniforms would not fit in French society, among other reasons. 
Whatever the exact intent, the “demobilization” had clear effects: Harkis had already 
been stripped of their Algerian identity and now they were also to lose their identity as 
French soldiers and the families of soldiers—the same identity that had given them 
reasons to fight for a French Algeria, that had caused many of their comrades-in-arms to 
die at the hands of fellow Algerians and fellow French soldiers, and that had forced them 
to leave their “homeland”—to use the word preferred by the French-Algerian author 
Assia Djebar when she writes on the complexities of French-Algerian identity.49 Many 
                                                
47 Ibid., 34 and Besnaci-Lancou’s own account in ibid., 76.
48 Marcos & Marcos, Les Camps de Rivesaltes, 96.
49 Assia Djebar, La Disparition de la langue française (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 2003), 13. 
Djebar uses this particular English term to refer to Algeria from a French-Algerian’s point-of-
82
Harkis understandably rejected the clothes offered them and continued to wear their old, 
faded uniforms. They still responded to “Garde à vous,” saluted officers, and helped raise 
and lower the French flag each day at the camp.50
The French government further stripped Harkis of their French identity in the 
most significant way possible—by revoking their citizenship. This was a consequence of 
the Evian Accords when Algeria was no longer part of France, and therefore its 
inhabitants were no longer French, except for the Pieds-noirs, whose French citizenship 
remained intact because of their claims to “French” ancestry. This revocation of French 
citizenship became official policy on 1 July 1962, leaving the Harkis confused and 
upset.51 They held French citizenship before, and had they not earned the right to keep 
their citizenship after fighting for France? One Harki refused to go in front of the tribunal 
that would evaluate requests for French citizenship, stating to the head officer of his 
sector of the camp, “I’m already French. If I’m not, why do you call me a ‘French 
Muslim’?”52 This same officer also refused to allow this internee and others to express 
yet another part of their identity—their faith. He refused their request for a place of 
prayer, saying that they were “in France now” and needed to forget their Muslim religion. 
The same Harki brought up once more that the French called him and his fellow Harkis 
“French Muslims.” Both times the officer refuted key parts of this identity—firstly their 
identity as French, and secondly their identity as Muslim.53 These internees thus had, in 
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the eyes of the French, no military affiliation, no nation, and no religion, leaving without 
any recognized identity, except perhaps the identity of a camp “internee;” one mother 
recalled her sadness when her child told a friend that “Mamie and papy are from 
Rivesaltes,” after the friend had asked her grandparents’ place of origin.54 Their place of 
internment became the Harki identifier. Despite the mistreatment by the French, the 
majority of the Harkis at Rivesaltes chose to be French and requested French 
citizenship.55 They had little other choice. As a final challenge to the former identity of 
these Harkis, however, the French government altered their last names and made them 
“French.”56 The internees then lost the inherited name of their family identity.
Though these families were military families, the French military did not want to 
take responsibility for them by actually managing the camp. It intended to make the camp 
a civilian site, which would allow the French military to leave. To this end, the military 
tried to find jobs for as many internees as possible—jobs out of the public view for which 
they would leave early in the morning and return late at night so as not to be seen. 
Internees usually worked in forestry, though some worked in agriculture or in industrial 
production.57 Those fit for work eventually moved away from the camp into newly 
constructed subsidized housing that was intended specifically for them. For a while, the 
government considered charging the Harkis rent for staying at Rivesaltes after it took 
over administration of the camp, but ultimately officials abandoned this thought.58 The 
government classified those unfit for work as “beyond help.” Though the camp officially 
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closed as a detention center for Harkis in 1964, many of these families stayed at 
Rivesaltes until 1971, when the last few Harkis and their families finally left.59
In 1964, the same year the Harki camp “officially” closed, troops from the 
African nation Guinea began to arrive. Though Guinea was no longer a French colony at 
that time, many of its citizens had signed 15-year service contracts with the French 
military before independence. A large number of these men did not want to lose the 
salary and pension they would receive from the French military, and therefore they 
attempted to continue to serve. Continuing to wear the French uniform in the newly 
independent nation, they were expelled from Guinea in 1964. These individuals carried 
out the rest of their service at the Camp de Rivesaltes between November 1964 and 
October 1966. The French military also tried to “civilianize” these troops, but in contrast 
to the Harkis they refused to work in jobs outside of the public eye. Most chose to stay in 
France after 1966, usually working in civilian jobs, though some remained in the military. 
Those who did neither of these things were sent back to Guinea. These were the last 
colonial troops at the camp.60
From 1971 to 1986, the camp served solely as a military installation for French 
troops, returning to its original purpose. It housed the 24th Marine Infantry Regiment, 
which eventually left the site and ultimately dissolved in 1991.61 In 1986, the camp 
became a detainment center for illegal immigrants, again coming to house a great number 
of Algerians. This new detainment occurred after the passage of the Pasqua law in the 
same year. Further laws restricting immigration followed in 1997 and 2006, thus keeping 
Rivesaltes open as a center for internment and deportations. The government limited 





internees’ stays to two days, though court orders from a judge could extend their time to 
fifteen days. Prisoners stayed in many of the same buildings that had been used since the 
camp’s construction; only three additional structures were built between 1986 and 2007. 
Detainees spent more than twelve hours a day in nine by nine meter cells with nothing 
more than a bed—not even a toilet, and they only spent one hour outside with police 
supervision, weather permitting. Reading was prohibited.62 From the camp, the 
government deported internees to their countries of origin—usually Algeria, Morocco, 
and Latin American nations. The camp finally ceased operation in 2007, as the 
government decided it was more efficient to deport immigrants from and detain them in 
other areas in France.63 Rivesaltes moved into a new phase of its history as it changed 
from an internment center and military camp into a memory site.
IV. Remembering Rivesaltes in the Shadow of the Holocaust
To preface this section, it is important to note the intended foci: the 
commemoration of Jewish internment at Rivesaltes and the commemoration of later 
Harki and Algerian internments at the same place. This part will not include an in-depth 
discussion of all remembrance surrounding these two groups, most especially Harkis, 
whose history at Rivesaltes and other camps is connected to many of the population’s 
protests and movements. This does not preclude, of course, the discussion of more 
general topics related to these two groups and the memories of their pasts that bear 
particular importance on analysis of commemoration at Camp Joffre.
When discussing remembrances of Jewish internment at the site, one must discuss 
the controversies surrounding the fichiers des juifs—large files kept in both unoccupied 
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and occupied France that held information on almost all Jews in France during World 
War II. French police used these files to identify Jews with the intention of “rounding 
them up,” interning them, and sometimes deporting them. General de Gaulle ordered 
these fichiers destroyed at the end of the war, as a practical step toward reducing divisive 
memories in the newly unified country. Some files fell through the cracks, however, 
including the Parisian files of 1941 and 1942 that were used to round up Jews in the 
famous “rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv.”64 In later years, many other departments in France found 
their own area’s fichier, including the Pyrénées-Orientales department, where the 
rediscovered fichier gave the names of all the Jews interned in and deported from the 
Camp Joffre de Rivesaltes between 1940 and 1942.65 The local government found this 
file in the spring of 1997, and many were surprised to learn that the camp had been used 
to intern Jews before their deportation because it was never previously connected to the 
Holocaust in French history. Before this discovery of key documents, the French knew 
the site held Spanish refugees in the late 30s, “political prisoners” starting in 1943, and 
“displaced persons” starting in 1945.66 There were certainly those who knew that Jews 
were also interned there, but the “official” and printed version of history made no note of 
either the internment or deportations.
A little over a year after the discovery of the fichier in Perpignan, various 
politicians, artists, and other citizens signed a petition for the protection of the camp as an 
official “lieu de mémoire,” detailing three demands: that at least one barracks remain in 
its then current dilapidated state, that one of the barracks be reconstructed to look like 
those used during World War II, and that the government create a multidisciplinary 
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documentation center.67 Responding to such demands, the government declared the camp 
an historical site on 4 May 2000 and then an official “lieu de mémoire” on 17 June 2000. 
Four commemorative plaques were eventually placed on the road that connects the 
various sectors of the camp—one for Spanish Republican refugees, one for interned and 
deported Jews, one for interned Gypsies, and one for Harkis.68 Plans have also been 
developed to create a memorial on the site, now that the camp has officially ceased 
operation as a detainment center. The French state has commissioned famous architect 
Rudy Ricciotti to design the space.69 Now Rivesaltes has become tied to this memorial 
project, which came about due to a call to remember the Jewish victims interned there 
between 1940 and 1942. But the emphasis on the Holocaust remembrance has again 
obscured the camp’s role as an internment center for other groups, including the Harkis 
and later Algerian immigrants.
Though Algerians, particularly Harkis, spent the most time at and have the longest 
history with Camp de Rivesaltes, their experiences there receive little recognition. As 
scholar and anthropologist Vincent Crapanzano states, “Harki history is a history of 
negated spaces.”70 Rivesaltes is a “negated space” for Harkis and their memories. Beyond 
the plaque placed at the site, there has been no commemoration of the camp as a place in 
which to remember the Harkis’ past, nor a move to commemorate it as such. More 
generally, many Harkis and their descendants have protested for recognition of the harms 
committed by the French state against them. In 1994, the National Assembly passed a law 
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recognizing Harkis’ and colonial soldiers’ participation in France’s campaigns in North 
Africa and Indochina. In this law, the French state also guaranteed some subsidies for 
these veterans and their families.71 This was the first step towards a complete recognition 
of Harki history, if there could ever be such a thing as “complete” recognition. One must 
note that the French state equated Harkis with colonial soldiers with this bill, effectively 
“negating” Harki identity, for Harkis never saw themselves as colonial subjects during 
their time of service; they saw themselves as French. This fact complicates the French 
view of Algeria because it shows that the French government still saw the Algeria of the 
Algerian War as French, but it did not view Algerians who fought for the French military 
then as French. The territory was French in the eyes of the nation, but the people native to 
this territory who fought for it to remain part of France were not. They were the “other.”
Following perhaps the endeavors of Jewish victims and their descendants to push 
the French state to recognize its unjust policies, procure financial reparations from the 
government, and charge the guilty, a group of Harkis and their descendants filed a claim 
against France in August 2001, two years after the official recognition of the Algerian 
War.72 Just as Klarsfeld’s actions led to the indictment and sometimes jailing of several 
individuals for crimes against humanity for their actions against Jews in World War II, 
this group expected a similar sort of justice for the Harkis that would involve charges of 
crimes against humanity. The difference here was that this group did not file suits against 
individual perpetrators; they filed a suit against the entire nation (that is to say the French 
government). The suit did not make it to court because the abandonment of the Harkis did 
not constitute a crime against humanity according to French judges because it did not 
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reveal a plan on the part of the French to “eliminate an entire population.”73 Those who 
brought the suit against the state thought otherwise, comparing their abandonment to 
genocide.74
Two months later in October 2001, then president of the Republic Jacques Chirac 
declared September 25th a national day of commemoration for the Harkis.75 In his speech 
at the Palais d’Elysée, he stated: 
“The Harkis will not remain the forgotten of a buried history. They must take 
their proper place in French memory. Historians must take up this cause, which 
should be carried out conscientiously and subjectively. Knowledge of the past—
because it renders justice to the victims of history—can only serve to strengthen 
national unity. This devoir de vérité finds its natural course through a devoir de 
reconnaissance.”76
Before speaking at the Palais d’Elysée, Chirac paid homage to the Harkis and their 
service at the Invalides.77 This is extremely important to note because the Invalides is a 
lieu de mémoire specific to French veterans, dating back to the reign of Louis XIV. This 
means the state officially recognized the Harkis as French soldiers, though nearly forty 
years after their service ended and when many no longer actively held on to this identity 
because of their mistreatment and “abandonment” by the state.
Two years later, in 2003, two days before the same national day of 
commemoration in September, a manifesto was made public, called the “Manifesto for 
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the Reappropriation of Confiscated Memories.”78 This document states that Harkis and 
immigrants should band together and “finally rewrite [their] history;” and it urges Harkis 
take up the “duty” and “responsibility” of “inscribing [their] common history in both 
French and Algerian collective memory...to reweave the thread of this confiscated 
memory, of this hidden heritage...to assure that the French and Algerians alike acquire an 
all-encompassing knowledge of this painful past in which they share.”79 Fatima Besnaci-
Lancou drafted the manifesto and many other prominent French citizens of both Harki 
and non-Harki Algerian descent signed it, including the deputy mayor of Paris, the 
deputy mayor of Strasbourg, novelist Leïla Sebbar, and the president of a prominent 
technology firm Yazid Sabeg, among others. Little came of this manifesto in terms of 
government response. However, this concept of “confiscated memories” is of 
consequence. Harkis, Algerian immigrants, and their descendants felt, and perhaps still 
feel, that France denied them their traumatic memories, and thus their identity, by 
refusing to recognize them. Since France refused and in many ways still refuses to 
acknowledge these traumatic memories and histories, it follows that the state would not 
recognize a site—lieu—of these memories, namely Rivesaltes.
Between 2003 and 2011, the movement for commemoration did not realize many 
of its goals. In 2012, however, something quite important occurred: President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, during his campaign for reelection, publicly recognized “the historical 
responsibility of France in the abandonment of the Harkis” in Perpignan, not far from the 
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Camp de Rivesaltes.80 He promised to do this when first elected to presidential office in 
2007, but never did. During this campaign visit, he made more campaign promises in 
regards to commemoration including the installment of a national memorial in Paris. 
Many criticized him for this recognition because they saw him as simply choosing to do 
it in order to procure the Harki and Pied-noir vote. Others also criticized him for not 
going far enough with his recognition, stating that France did not just abandon the Harkis, 
they directly contributed to their massacre in Algeria. Going further with recognition 
would “open the door for financial compensation.”81 Whether Sarkozy’s statement 
accomplished complete recognition or not, and whether this was a political move or not, 
it has at the very least paved the way for future commemoration and for educating the 
French population about Harki, and French, history.
While many Harkis and their descendants criticize the French government for not 
going far enough and securing financial reparations for them, many others do not criticize 
it, stating that all they want is for their children to have better lives than they have had, 
with better and more secure job prospects.82 Still others say they do want official 
recognition on behalf of the government, but do not care if they receive financial 
reparations—they “only want [their] honor returned to [them].”83 Some do not even want 
this recognition, afraid it may cause them and their children even more trouble than they 
have already suffered, preferring to, in a manner of speaking, keep their heads down and 
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let God judge their persecutors.84 These varied approaches to remembering the traumatic 
Harki-French past reveal exactly what historian Benjamin Stora found among all 
different people in regards to remembering the Algerian War, in general—that many 
different memories of a single event exist among all those directly or indirectly 
involved.85 Such differences just within one group—the Harkis, themselves—complicate 
commemorative efforts, especially when those individuals vying for recognition use a 
Vichy Syndrome-like template which, if realized, would not allow the Harki memory to 
rest; it denies these victims the “right to forget,” just as it does for Holocaust victims.86
Beyond not having power over whether their past gets collectively memorialized 
or not, Harkis, as well as Algerians, do not have power over how it gets memorialized. 
One might say this is the same for Holocaust victims, which is true. However, Harkis 
experience it in a different way because their history is part of a colonial past. Whether or 
not France considered Algeria as more than a colony or territory and the people as 
“French” and not Algerian, the country and the people were not “French” by the 
definitions of a certain ethno-cultural, nationalist perspective and were treated in much 
the same way as French colonies and their subjects. Algerians and Harkis were, and still 
are to a certain degree, not French in the eyes of many French citizens. This perception 
persists even if persons of Algerian origins obtained French citizenship or were born in 
France, according to the français de souche—the “true” or “native” French, an identity 
that does not truly exist by any exact definition, but rather ambiguous criteria like one’s 
“appearance” as “French.” Thus, when France commemorates Harkis and Algerians, it 
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commemorates them closer to the way in which it commemorates colonial subjects rather 
than French citizens; evidence of this can be found with things like the bill passed in 
1994, mentioned earlier, which equated Harkis with colonial soldiers. The French state 
chooses their identity for them, and the identity chosen is a colonial one. This means their 
memories are also seen as colonial experiences, which cannot be denied, but taken 
singularly as colonial experiences denies the Harki, and other Algerians’, identification as 
French. In addition, the simple fact that the French state chooses is important because this 
means that even in the era of post-decolonization, the colonizer continues to define the 
identity and memories of the formerly colonized.
Though both the October Massacre and the Harki/Algerian camp history relate to 
a colonial identity, it seems that the camp history is associated with it more so than the 
October Massacre. This is most likely because of the specific historical similarities and 
memorial connections the ratonnade has with rafle du Vél’ Hiv. Thus the effect of the 
Vichy Syndrome on Rivesaltes differs from the effect of the Syndrome on the ratonnade. 
Though Rivesaltes is a shared lieu de mémoire, Holocaust memory at the site does not 
lead to the development of an obsession with and commemoration of Algerian 
persecution in the same place. The similarities between Jewish and Algerian internment 
stop with the simple fact that the two groups shared a internment site years apart from 
one another. In addition to a lack of reciprocal obsession as a result of relatively few 
specific connections with the Holocaust, the colonial past associated with the Algerian 
population interned in Camp Joffre is a barrier to commemoration, especially if those 
seeking commemoration expect the Vichy Syndrome—taken here as an obsession with 
seeking recognition that worked for a population without a colonial past—to work for 
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them. Harkis and Algerians chose this model because it was so successful—successful 
enough to almost totally eclipse all other modern traumatic pasts in France including their 
own—without recognizing its inapplicability to their situation. The obsession that has 
begun to develop around the ratonnade as a result of the Syndrome is an anomaly in 
French collective memory of Algerian War events. The Vichy Syndrome, this “past that 
does not pass,” complicates some and inadvertently denies other traumatic pasts, like the 
Algerian past at the Camp Joffre de Rivesaltes. In addition, if a Syndrome-like obsession 
succeeded for Algerian memory at Rivesaltes, such an obsession would lead to an 
“official,” perpetual colonial identity of the victims and their memories. They would not 
be able to escape the colonial past they have tried to move beyond in a “postcolonial” 
world, because it would not pass—that is the nature of the Vichy Syndrome.
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Conclusion: Patterns and Problems in Modern Trauma
The French obsession with the Vichy and Occupation period certainly continues 
to this day. It simultaneously influences and is influenced by other pasts and their 
memories, specifically the Algerian War and its myriad memories. The continued 
construction of museums and memorials that commemorate the Holocaust in France 
demonstrate this, as do calls by victims of French oppression during the Algerian War for 
the same. Beyond affirming the Vichy Syndrome’s contemporary presence, research on 
specific sites connected to these two pasts—the French implication in the Holocaust and 
the oppression of Algerian supporters of the FLN as well as Harkis during the Algerian 
War—reveal the links between their histories and the Vichy Syndrome because the 
Holocaust tends to dominate memories of past injustices.
First and foremost, this obsession marks a guilty conscience on the part of the 
French state that results from a failure to acknowledge known historical truths of the 
Vichy and Occupation period which implicate a large number of French citizens. The 
French state continues to struggle with its historical pattern of avoiding discussion and 
avoiding admittance of the truth about controversial, traumatic events in the name of 
preventing discord and preserving unity, both in regards to the Algerian War and the 
Holocaust. Secondly, a failure to officially recognize controversial aspects of the 
Algerian War may perpetuate France’s obsession with its Vichy past. Papon and the 
Vélodrome d’Hiver, as lieux de mémoire, link aggression against Algerians in Paris with 
the round up of Jews in the city. Since there were many similarities between the 
ratonnade of Algerians and the rafle of Jews, a lack of official recognition for one 
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perpetuates the over-commemoration and frequent recollection of the other; the two pasts 
and their memories do not rest. 
Thirdly,victims of Algerian War-related events who seek public recognition of 
their trauma accept the Syndrome—here meaning official state recognition of complicity 
in the Holocaust, the procurement of reparations for victims and their families, and the 
trial of guilty parties—as a template for their path to recognition because of its perceived 
success for another minority. This is problematic because though they share some 
similarities in regards to place and methods of oppression, the situations and identities of 
French-Jews and French-Algerians differ greatly. Therefore, they require different 
approaches in regards to official recognition that take into account each group’s identities 
and desired outcomes. The Vichy Syndrome can in fact complicate and shroud 
commemoration of other traumatic events, specifically the Algerian War—internment 
and oppression of both Algerians who supported the FLN and Harkis. This speaks to the 
problems of attempting to apply what worked for one group, or a portion of one group, to 
another. It particularly complicates Algerian commemoration because the lack of 
recognition reinforces a colonized identity, where the colonizer still defines their lives 
and experiences in a “post-colonial” world. French-Algerians cannot break away from 
their “othered” identity which prevents them from fully realizing their French citizenship.
In regards to the idea of one past shrouding another, I reiterate that I do not intend 
to compare victimhood. One past is not of greater or lesser import than another, and the 
same with one memory within a group related to a certain history. No one event should 
be consciously forgotten in the face of the other. It is apparent, however, that one past, or 
rather its memorial presence, may make it difficult for another past to achieve official
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recognition and commemoration. This is the case with the French Holocaust past and the 
French Algerian War past at the Camp de Rivesaltes; the Vichy Syndrome as it relates to 
the French Holocaust fully occupies and obsesses French collective memory of the site, 
making it difficult for other traumatic memories to achieve recognition there especially 
when there is still a reluctance to come to terms with the controversial aspects of French 
history that are connected to the Algerian War. 
Some Holocaust victims and victims of violence in France during and after the 
Algerian War do not want to remember and therefore do not want recognition of past 
traumas like those suffered at the Camp de Rivesaltes. Some believe that forgetting will 
make their life easier in France, make them feel more integrated, and cause less discord 
with fellow French citizens. Some want to forget because commemoration effectively 
makes them relive the trauma. The Vichy Syndrome does not allow those victims to 
forget. As Rousso states, it denies a droit à l’oubli—“right to forget.”1 Rather it asserts a 
devoir de mémoire, or “duty to remember.” Both ideas have their merits, after all one 
should not forget traumatic events that have a large impact on others’ identities. 
However, at the same time, one should not deny a victim the right to forget. The balance 
here is a tricky one that requires sensitivity to the multiplicity of memorial desires among 
the victims of a trauma.
There are some positive consequences of the Vichy Syndrome, For one, it benefits 
research by leading to the discovery of new materials about these traumas and the partial 
or complete opening of archives previously closed to the public. It can also shed light on 
other issues even though it may sometimes shroud these same issues. Lastly, it can result 
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in a place or places where those victims who desire commemoration and recognition can 
feel a sense of peace and justice. Lieux de mémoiremight not be so strong as to give a 
final resting place for painful histories, especially when talking about the Holocaust in 
France and the Algerian War. The Vichy Syndrome makes that impossible, as it calls for 
constant recollection of an event—a devoir de mémoire. However, such memory sites can 
serve a purpose for victims and thus remain significant. 
The Vichy Syndrome continues to complicate national collective French 
identities, specifically because of the French paradox mentioned throughout this thesis: 
the simultaneous desires to uphold universal human rights and for national unity. One 
calls for admitting the truth and serving justice, while the other calls the nation to forget 
in order to not sow discord. For French-Jewish identity, it can be problematic in the sense 
that in some ways it ignores the existence of multiple memories, identities, and struggles 
within the Jewish population, specifically in relation to the Holocaust. As stated before, 
however, it can also be positive through the provision of commemorative spaces for those 
victims and their families who feel remembering serves an important purpose for their 
identities and memories. For French-Algerian identities, it can be both positive and 
negative; it has led the state to recognize the persecution of Algerians, but this official 
recognition can also deny the existence of multiple memories, struggles, and identities 
amongst victims and their families as with French Jews, as well as unknowingly shroud 
Algerian-related pasts and memories. 
I do not believe I can speak to what this means for other minority identities within 
France, as I do not want to imply that my research on the Vichy Syndrome is somehow 
applicable to all French and non-French traumas. These two cases of Algerian War-
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related acts and Holocaust-related acts committed on French soil are thus special; their 
similarities and evident influence on one another make it possible to analyze, compare, 
and contrast them within the context of this Vichy Syndrome that impacts them both so 
heavily.
In regards to the larger study of memory and history, these conclusions suggest an 
“intersectional” approach to the historical study of trauma and memory. Here I use the 
term intersectional to mean the intersection of traumatic histories with one another. Many 
traumas and their related identities in the post-Holocaust world “intersect” with the 
Holocaust past and this cannot be ignored or extrapolated from analysis of these events 
and their commemoration. Another example of this “intersectionality” of traumatic 
histories would be in the inability to forget traumas committed in the colonial period in 
light of a trauma that occurs after the colonizers have left. In order to develop a better 
understanding of collective French identity and group identities within France, it is 
important to research and analyze traumatic events like the rafle du Vél’ d’Hiv and the 
ratonnade d’octobre and their commemoration because traumatic events so often define 
large parts of individual, group, and national identity. France has faced particular 
challenges in reconciling the history of the Holocaust and the Algerian War with a 
prevailing national narrative about French support for universal human rights. But the 
struggle to accept the history of recent injustices in France suggests the difficulty of 
coming to terms with a painful pattern of injustices in any modern nation. Furthermore, 
such universal significance shows the importance of studying the history of memory and 











Assemblée nationale. Loi nº94-488, 1994. Legifrance. Online.
Besnaci-Lancou, Fatima and Gilles Manceron. Les Harkis dans la colonisation et ses
suites. Ivry-sur-Seine: Les Editions d’Atelier, 2008.
––––––. “Manifeste pour la ré-appropriation des mémoires confisquées.” 23 September
2004. http://www.ldh-toulon.net/IMG/manifeste_4oct04.pdf.
––––––. Nos mères, paroles blesses. Léchelle, France: Editions Emina Soleil, 2007.
Djebar, Assia. La Disparition de la langue française. Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 2003. 
Galerie d’Art, Espace 13, Des Peintres au Camp des Milles, septembre 1939-été 1941:
Hans Bellmer, Max Ernst, Robert Liebknecht, Leo Marschütz, Ferdinand
Springer, Wols. Aix-en-Provence: Actes Sud, 1997.
Feuchtwanger, Lion. Le Diable en France, trans. Jean-Claude Capèle. Paris: Belfond,
2010.
101
Klarsfeld, Serge. Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich: Deutsche Dokumente
1941-1944. Paris: Klarsfeld, 1977.
––––––. Le Calendrier de la persecution des juifs de France 1940-1944. Paris: Fayard,
2001.
––––––. Vichy-Auschwitz: Le role de Vichy dans la Solution finale de la question juive en
France-1942. Paris: Fayard, 1983.
La Fondation du Camp des Milles, “Site-mémorial du Camp des Milles-comprendre pour
demain.” Aix-en-Provence: Exprimer, 2012.
Albin Michel, Le Procès de Maurice Papon, Paris, Albin Michel: 1998.
Péju, Marcel and Paulette. Le 17 octobre des Algériens. Paris: La Découverte, 2011.
Rajsfus, Maurice. Paris, 1942: Chroniques d’un survivant. Paris: Editions Noesis, 2002.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 754.
Vincenot, Alain. Vel’d’Hiv: 16 juillet 1942. Paris: L’Archipel, 2012.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Azni, Boussad. Crime d’Etat: Généalogie d’un abandon. Paris: Editions Ramsay, 2002.
Blanchard, Emmanuel. La Police parisienne et les Algériens (1944-1962). Paris:
Nouveau Monde, 2011.
Boîtel, Anne. Le Camp de Rivesaltes 1941-1942: Du centre d’hébergement au “Drancy
de la zone libre.” Perpignan, France: Presses Universitaires de Perpignan/Mare
Nostrum,2001.
Carrier, Peter. Holocaust Monuments and National Memory Cultures in France and
Germany since 1989: The Origins and Political Function of the Vél’ d’Hiv in
102
Paris and the Holocaust Monument in Berlin. New York: Berghahn Books, 2005.
Cohen, Marcel et al. Les Camps en Provence : exil, internement, déportation, 1933-1944.
Aix-en-Provence : Editions Alinéa et L.L.C.G., 1984.
Conan, Eric and Henry Rousso. Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas. Paris: Librairie
Arthème Fayard/Pluriel, 2013.
Crapanzano, Vincent. The Harkis: The Wound that Never Heals. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2011.
Dris, Youcef. Massacres d’Octobre 1961: Papon la honte. Algiers: Editions Alpha, 2009.
Einaudi, Jean-Luc, Octobre 1961: Un massacre à Paris. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard,
2001.
Fontaine, André. Le Camp d’étrangers des Milles 1939-1940 (Aix-en-Provence). 
Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1989.
Golsan, Richard J., ed. Memory, the Holocaust, and French Justice: the Bousquet and
Touvier Affairs. Trans. Lucy and Richard J. Golsan. Hanover, NH: University of
New EnglandPress, 1996.
––––––. The Papon Affair: Memory and Justice on Trial. Trans. Lucy B. and Richard J.
Golsan. New York: Routledge, 2000.
House, Jim and Neil MacMaster. Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Jordi, Jean-Jacques and Mohand Hamoumou. Les harkis, une mémoire enfouie. Paris:
Editions Autrement, 1999.
LaCapra, Dominick. Writing History, Writing Trauma. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2001.
103
Levine, Michel. Les Ratonnades d’Octobre: Un meurtre collectif à Paris en 1961. Paris:
Jean-Claude Gawsewitch Editeur, 2011.
Lindeperg, Sylvie. “Nuit et brouillard”: un film dans l’histoire. Paris: Odile Jacob, 2007.
Marcos Violette and Juanito, Les Camps de Rivesaltes: une histoire de l’enfermement
(1935-2007). Portet-sur-Garonne, France: Nouvelles Editions Loubatières, 2009.
Mencherini, Robert, ed. Provence-Auschwitz: De l’internement des étrangers à la
deportationdes juifs (1939-1944). Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l’Université
de Provence, 2007.
Nora, Pierre, ed. Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. Trans. Arthur
Goldhammer.New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
––––––. Rethinking France: Les Lieux de mémoire. Trans. Mary Trouille. Chicago:
University ofChicago Press, 2001.
Peschanski, Denis. La France des camps: L’internement, 1938-1946. Paris: Gallimard,
2002.
Rajsfus, Maurice. Drancy: Un camp de concentration très ordinaire 1941-1944. Paris: le
cherche midi éditeur, 1996.
Rothberg Michael. Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of
Decolonization. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
Rousso, Henry. The Haunting Past: History, Memory, and Justice in Contemporary
France.Trans. Ralph Schoolcraft. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2002.
––––––. The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944. Trans. Arthur
Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.
104
Stora, Benjamin and Mohammed Harbi.La Guerre d’Algérie: 1954-2004, la fin de
l’amnésie.Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 2004.
––––––.  Le transfert d’une mémoire: De l’”Algérie française” au racisme anti-arabe.
Paris:Editions de la Découverte, 1999.
Wieviorka, Annette and Michel Laffitte, A l’Intérieur du Camp de Drancy. Paris: Perrin,
2012.
